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Abstract
In a zero-sum stochastic game, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive
a stage payoff determined by them and by a random variable representing the state of nature. The
total payoff is the discounted sum of the stage payoffs. Assume that the players are very patient
and use optimal strategies. We then prove that, at any point in the game, players get essentially
the same expected payoff: the payoff is constant. This solves a conjecture by Sorin, Venel and
Vigeral (2010). The proof relies on the semi-algebraic approach for discounted stochastic games
introduced by Bewley and Kohlberg (1976), on the theory of Markov chains with rare transitions,
initiated by Friedlin and Wentzell (1984), and on some variational inequalities for value functions
inspired by the recent work of Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique (2016).
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1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [14], to model a repeated interaction between two
opponent players in a changing environment. At each stage m ∈ N∗ of the game, players play a
zero-sum game that depends on a state variable. Formally, knowing the current state km, Player
1 chooses an action im and Player 2 chooses an action jm. Their choices occur independently and
simultaneously and have two consequences: first, they produce a stage payoff gm := g(km, im, jm)
and second, together with the current state km they determine the law q(km, im, jm) of the next
period’s state km+1. Thus, the sequence of states follows a Markov chain controlled by the actions
of both players. To any λ ∈ (0, 1] and any initial state k corresponds a λ-discounted game, denoted
by Γλ(k), in which Player 1 maximizes the expectation of
∑
m≥1 λ(1−λ)m−1gm given that k1 = k.
Player 2 minimizes this same amount.
A crucial aspect in this model is that the current state is commonly observed by the players at
every stage. Another one is stationarity: the transition function and stage payoff function do not
change over time. Together, these assumptions yield a dynamic programming principle, as first
noted by Shapley (also known as Shapley’s equation). We assume throughout this paper that the
set of states and the action sets for both players are finite sets, as in the original model proposed
by Shapley. Under these assumptions, for each initial state k and discount factor λ, the game has a
value vλ(k) ∈ R and both players have stationary optimal strategies, that is, strategies that depend
on the past only through the current state (see [14]). As in any zero-sum game, the value represents
Player 1’s payoff when both players are rational, i.e. use optimal strategies.
A wide area of research is to investigate the properties of the discounted game, when λ tends
to 0. Intuitively, this corresponds to a game played either between very patient players, or between
players who are very likely to interact a great number of times. Building on Shapley’s equation,
Bewley and Kohlberg [1] proved that the value function vλ converges as λ tends to 0. Their ap-
proach was quite a breakthrough, as it established a connection between real algebraic geometry
(namely, semi-algebraic sets) and Shapley equation1. An alternative proof of this result was re-
cently obtained by Oliu-Barton [11], using probabilistic and linear programming techniques. The
finiteness assumption plays a crucial role in the convergence of the values, as emphasised by the
counterexamples of Vigeral [20] and Ziliotto [21] who considered, respectively, the case of compact
action sets and compact state space.
A remarkable property, referred to as the constant payoff property was proved by Sorin, Venel
and Vigeral [17] in the framework of a single decision-maker problem: for any λ small enough, the
existence of an optimal strategy such that, for any initial state k, the expectation of the cumulated
payoff
∑M
m=1 λ(1−λ)m−1gm is approximatively equal to (
∑M
m=1 λ(1−λ)m−1)v∗(k), where v∗ ∈ RK
denotes the vector of limit values. Note that the positive weights λ(1−λ)m−1 add up to 1, so that∑M
m=1 λ(1 − λ)m−1 represents the fraction of the game that has already been played at stage M .
The constant payoff property is not straightforward. Indeed, in a dynamical setting, it could be
that during the first half of the game, the decision-maker gets a high payoff, while in the second
half, he gets a low payoff (see the example in Lehrer and Sorin [9]). The constant payoff prop-
erty was established under the assumption that the values converge as the discount factor tends
to 0, and that the convergence is uniform in the state space. Moreover, the authors conjectured
that the property should also hold for two-player zero-sum game under the same assumption. As
finite stochastic games satisfy this assumption, the conjecture concerned directly this class of games.
Up to date, the constant payoff property is known to hold for absorbing games, that is, the sub-
set of stochastic games in which all states except one are absorbing. Sorin and Vigeral [18] proved
that, for finite absorbing games, the constant payoff property holds in the following stronger sense:
any couple of asymptotically optimal strategies induces a constant payoff during the game. Beyond
the finite framework, the authors established the constant payoff property for absorbing games
with compact action sets and jointly continuous payoff and transition functions. Oliu-Barton [12]
established the same property for the splitting game, an auxiliary stochastic game with compact
action sets and jointly continuous payoff and transition function that captures the information as-
pects of repeated games with incomplete information on both sides. Let us note that, in spite of
1The semi-algebraic approach led to another major accomplishment a few years later: the existence of a uniform value
by Mertens and Neyman [10]. This approach was refined recently by Bolte, Vigeral and Gaubert [3] for infinite action
sets.
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2 MODEL AND MAIN RESULTS
their differences, absorbing games and games with incomplete information have in common that
the dynamics of the game has an irreversible property, which is not present in stochastic games.
The main contribution of this paper is to establish that finite stochastic games have the constant
payoff property, and thus to solve the conjecture in Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [17]. The property
is established in a strong sense: under any optimal play, the cumulated payoff up to a fraction
t ∈ [0, 1] of the game will be approximatively equal to tv∗(k), for any sufficiently small discount
factor. On its own, our result provides a new remarkable property for these games. Moreover, our
analysis has brought into light new useful connections between the limit value function and some
occupation measures on the state space induced by the optimal strategies, as well as new varia-
tional inequalities. The first part of our proof relies heavily on the algebraic approach developed
by Bewley and Kohlberg [1], namely that the value function vλ and optimal stationary strategies
can be developed as a Puiseux series in a neighborhood of 0. Thanks to these expansions, the
random times spent in each state (or set of states), as λ goes to 0 can be well studied with the
theory of Markov chains with rare transitions initiated by Friedlin and Wentzell [7], and developed
by Catoni and Cerf [4], Trouve´ [19] and others. Building on the hierarchy of cycles, we focus
on relevant cycles which are those in which the state stays a non-negligible fraction of the game.
This way, one can characterise the constant payoff property in terms of a property satisfied by
the occupation measures induced by the optimal strategies. The second part builds on a recent
result from Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique [6], from which we establish useful variational
inequalities for the discounted value functions. These two arguments prove the weak constant
payoff property, that is, the existence of a couple of optimal strategies for which the cumulated
payoff grows linearly with time. In order to extend the constant payoff property to any profile
of optimal strategies, the third ingredient of the proof is the introduction of an auxiliary Markov
decision process where a fictitious decision-maker aims at maximizing the discounted average of the
total variation of the values during the play. We show that the value of this MDP converges to 0
as the discount factor vanishes, and that this property is equivalent to the constant payoff property.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the model and main result. Section 3 is
devoted to the proof of the weak constant payoff property. Section 4 proves the strong property.
Section 5 is devoted to some remarks and extensions.
2 Model and main results
2.1 Standard stochastic games
We consider throughout this paper a standard two player zero-sum stochastic game, as introduced
by Shapley [14]. Such games are described by a 5-tuple Γ = (K, I, J, g, q), where K is the set of
states, I and J are the action sets of Player 1 and 2 respectively, g : K × I × J → R is the payoff
function and q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function. For each finite set X , we denote by
∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X . We assume that K, I and J are finite sets.
We set ‖g‖ := max(k,i,j) |g(k, i, j)|.
2.1.1 The stochastic game Γλ(k)
For any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] and any k ∈ K, the λ-discounted game with initial state k is
denoted by Γλ(k) and proceeds as follows: at every stage m ≥ 1, knowing the current state km,
the players choose simultaneously and independently actions im and jm; Player 1 receives the stage
payoff g(km, im, jm), and Player 2 receives −g(km, im, jm). A new state km+1 is drawn according to
the probability q(· | km, im, jm) and communicated to both players, together2 with (im, jm). Player
1 maximizes the expectation of the λ-discounted average of the stage payoffs, i.e. the expectation
of: ∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
The sequence (k1, i1, j1, ..., km, im, jm, ...) generated along the game is called a play. The set of
plays is (K × I × J)N∗ .
Definition 2.1.
2The observation of the past actions is known as perfect monitoring. An extension to a more general model, in which
the players receive signals, is described in Section 5.3.
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(i) A strategy for a player specifies a mixed action to each possible set of past observations:
formally, a strategy for Player 1 is a collection of maps σ1 = (σ1)m≥1, where σ
1
m : (K × I ×
J)m−1 ×K → ∆(I). Similarly, a strategy for Player 2 is a collection of maps σ2 = (σ2)m≥1,
where σ2m : (K × I × J)m−1 ×K → ∆(J).
(ii) A stationary strategy plays according to the current state only. Formally, a stationary strategy
for Player 1 is a mapping x1 : K → ∆(I). Similarly, a stationary strategy for Player 2 is a
mapping x2 : K → ∆(J).
(iii) A strategy profile is a pair of strategies (σ1, σ2).
N.B. The set of strategies will be denoted by Σ1 and Σ2, the sets of stationary strategies by ∆(I)K
and ∆(J)K .
We denote by Pkσ1,σ2 the unique probability measure on the set of plays (K× I×J)N such that,
for any finite play hn = (k1 = k, i1, j1, . . . , kn−1, in−1, jn−1, kn) one has:
P
k
σ1,σ2(hn) =
n−1∏
m=1
σ1m[h
n
m](im)σ
2
m[h
n
m](jm)q(km+1|km, im, jm)
where hnm is the restriction of h
n to the first m stages, i.e. hn1 := k1 and for all 2 ≤ m < n:
hnm := (k1, i1, j1, . . . , km−1, im−1, jm−1, km)
The extension to infinite plays follows from Kolmogorov’s extension theorem. Thus, Pkσ1,σ2 is the
unique probability measure on plays induced by (σ1, σ2) in the stochastic game starting from state
k (the dependence on the transition function q is omitted, because it is an intrinsic datum of the
problem).
The expectation with respect to Pkσ1,σ2 is denoted by E
k
σ1,σ2 , and the expected payoff by:
γλ(k, σ
1, σ2) := Ekσ1,σ2
[∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
]
(1)
By Shapley [14], the game Γλ(k) has a value:
vλ(k) = max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
γλ(k, σ
1, σ2) = min
σ2∈Σ2
max
σ1∈Σ1
γλ(k, σ
1, σ2)
A strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 is optimal for Player 1 if it realizes the left-hand side maximum. A strategy
σ2 ∈ Σ2 is optimal for Player 2 if it realizes the right-hand side minimum.
Both players have optimal stationary strategies. The set of optimal stationary strategies for Player
i = 1, 2 is denoted by X iλ; the set of (general) optimal strategies by Σ
i
λ.
2.1.2 The semi-algebraic approach
Fix λ ∈ (0, 1] and let vλ ∈ RK be the vector of values. Let (x1λ, x2λ) ∈ X1λ × X2λ be a couple of
optimal stationary strategies. Building on Shapley’s results, Bewley and Kohlberg [1] defined a
subset S ⊂ R×RK ×RK×I ×RK×J by setting (λ, v, x1, x2) ∈ S if and only the following relations
hold:
• λ ∈ R is some discount factor, that is 0 < λ ≤ 1
• v ∈ RK is the vector of values of the λ-discounted stochastic game Γλ
• (x1, x2) ∈ RK×I × RK×J is a couple of optimal stationary strategies in Γλ
By Shapley [14] the set S is semi-algebraic, as it can be described by the following finite set of
polynomial equalities and inequalities:
0 < λ ≤ 1
∀(k, i), x1(k, i) ≥ 0, and ∀k,
∑
i∈I
x1(k, i) = 1
∀(k, j), x2(k, j) ≥ 0, and ∀k,
∑
j∈J
x2(k, j) = 1
∀(k, j),
∑
i∈I
x1(k, i)
(
λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)v(k′)
)
≥ v(k)
∀(k, i),
∑
i∈I
x2(k, j)
(
λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)v(k′)
)
≤ v(k)
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By the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem, λ 7→ vλ is a real semi-algebraic function and there
exist a selection of optimal strategies (x1λ, x
2
λ) such that λ 7→ x1λ(k, i) and λ 7→ x2λ(k, j) are real
semi-algebraic functions as well, for all (k, i, j). Yet any bounded real semi-algebraic function
f : (0, 1] → R admits a Taylor expansion in fractional powers (a.k.a. Puiseux expansion) in some
neighborhood of 0, i.e. there exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1], N ∈ N∗ and a real sequence (am)m≥0 such that:
f(λ) =
∑
m≥0
amλ
m/N , ∀λ ∈ (0, λ0)
The first remarkable consequence of this approach is that the vector of values vλ converges as λ
vanishes. The limit will be denoted by v∗. The second is the existence of an optimal Puiseux
strategy profile, defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. An optimal Puiseux strategy profile is a family of optimal stationary profiles
(x1λ, x
2
λ)λ such that, for some λ0 ∈ (0, 1] and some N ∈ N∗, the mappings λ 7→ x1λ(k, i) and λ 7→
x2λ(k, j) are real Puiseux series on (0, λ0) with common
3 denominator N , for all (k, i, j) ∈ K×I×J .
2.1.3 The game on [0, 1]
The discount factor λ can be interpreted in several different manners, such as:
(a) The interaction may stop, i.e. at every stage m ≥ 1, the game stops with probability λ.
(b) The players are impatient, i.e. payoffs at stage m are more valuable than the same payoffs at
stage m+ 1. In this interpretation, the discount factor stands for an interest rate.
(c) Stages have decreasing weights, i.e. every stage m ≥ 1 has a weight θm := λ(1−λ)m−1, which
indicates the importance of the stage. Note that θm > 0 and
∑
m≥1 θm = 1 so that the overall
payoff is a weighted average of the stage payoffs.
Though the three interpretations are equivalent for all purposes, (c) presents an appealing feature:
one can define some sort of clock which indicates the fraction of the game at any given stage. For
any discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1], one defines:
η(λ, 0) := 0 and η(λ,M) :=
M∑
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1 = 1− (1− λ)M , ∀M ∈ N∗
Hence, η(λ,M) is the total weight of stages 1, . . . ,M in the λ-discounted game. For any λ ∈ (0, 1),
the function η(λ, · ) is strictly increasing from N to the interval [0, 1). Let ⌊x⌋ be the integer part
of x. Note that for any ε > 0 and α > 0, the following relations hold:
lim
λ→0
η(λ, ⌊αλ−1+ε⌋) = 0, lim
λ→0
η(λ, ⌊αλ−1⌋) = 1− e−α and lim
λ→0
η(λ, ⌊αλ−1−ε⌋) = 1 (2)
For 0 < ǫ < 1, the terms ⌊αλ−1+ε⌋, ⌊αλ−1⌋, and ⌊αλ−1−ε⌋ go to +∞ as λ tends to 0, but according
to (2) they correspond (asymptotically) to very different times of the game: the first one converges
to a fraction 0 of the game, the second converges to a fraction 1 − e−α ∈ (0, 1), and the third
one converges to 1. In the sequel, we will sometimes refer to the fraction 0 of the game as “the
beginning of the game”, and to the fraction 1 as the “end of the game”.
Remark 2.3. Note that there are many possible ways to define the fraction 0 of the game: f(λ) = 1
and f(λ) = ⌊λ−1/2⌋ both have the property that limλ→0 η(λ, f(λ)) = 0. For our purposes (see
Section 3.1), it will be convenient to set the “beginning of the game” at stage ⌊λ−1+ 12N ⌋, and “the
end of the game” at stage ⌊λ−1− 12N ⌋.
Conversely, for any fraction of the game t ∈ [0, 1] and any discount factor λ, there exists some
stage such that the total weight of the previous stages first exceed t. This yields to the definition
of an inverse-clock ϕ(λ, t) ∈ N∗:
ϕ(λ, t) := inf{M ≥ 1, η(λ,M) ≥ t}, ∀t ∈ [0, 1) and ϕ(λ, 1) := +∞
Note that ϕ(λ, 0) = 1 for all λ and that, as λ tends to 0, the following relation holds for all t ∈ [0, 1):
lim
λ→0
λϕ(λ, t) = − ln(1− t) (3)
lim
λ→0
η(λ, ⌊− ln(1− t)λ−1⌋) = t (4)
3By finiteness, one can assume without loss of generality that N and λ0 are common in the expansions of vλ(k),
x1λ(k, i) and x
2
λ(k, j), for all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J .
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The notion of clock and inverse-clock, which are now standard, were initiated by Sorin [16]. It
allows to consider the discrete-time game Γλ(k) as a game played in the time interval [0, 1]. In
particular, for any fraction t ∈ [0, 1] one can define the cumulated payoff up to time t.
Definition 2.4. For any k ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1], and any strategy profile (σ1, σ2) of Γλ(k), we define
the cumulated payoff up to time t ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
γλ(k, σ
1, σ2; t) := Ekσ1,σ2
[∑ϕ(λ,t)
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−1g(km, im, jm)
]
(5)
Note that this definition extends (1) since γλ(k, σ
1, σ2; 1) = γλ(k, σ
1, σ2) for all k, σ1, σ2 and λ.
2.2 Main result
Our main result is a precise characterisation of the cumulated payoff at time t, when both players
use optimal strategies.
Theorem 2.5 (Strong constant payoff property). For any ε > 0, there exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all λ ∈ (0, λ0), t ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ K and (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1λ × Σ2λ one has:∣∣γλ(k, σ1, σ2; t)− tv∗(k)∣∣ ≤ ε
Our result solves the conjecture raised by Sorin, Venel and Vigeral [17]. Note that the constant
payoff property is established for any optimal strategy profile, that is, not necessarily stationary,
nor of Puiseux type. An extension to asymptotically optimal strategies is described in Section 5.4.
2.3 Sketch of the proof
The aim of this section is to guide the reader through the proof of Theorem 2.5, by providing an
overlook of its main parts. To go straight to the proof, the reader may directly go to Section 3.
The proof is divided in 6 parts: parts 1–4 establish the so-called weak constant payoff property,
that is, that any optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x1λ, x
2
λ)λ induces a constant payoff; parts 5 and
6 conclude the proof, by extending the constant payoff property to any optimal strategy profile.
Part 1. Let (x1λ, x
2
λ)λ be some fixed optimal Puiseux strategy profile and let Qλ be the Markov
chain on the state space induced by this profile. By the choice of (x1λ, x
2
λ)λ, the family (Qλ)λ is
a family of Markov chains with rare transitions, so that one can define a hierarchy of cycles, as
in the theory developed by Friedlin and Wentzell [7]. Because of the discounting, only some of
these cycles will be relevant, that is, cycles in which the chain stays a positive fraction of the game.
States which do not belong to any relevant cycle are transient in the sense that the chain stays a
negligible fraction of the game in them. The state space is thus partitioned into relevant cycles and
transient states. This way, we obtain the relation Πt =
∫ t
0 πsds for all t ∈ (0, 1), where πt and Πt
are the following limit matrices in RK×K :
• Πt := limλ→0
∑ϕ(λ,t)
m=1 λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ
• It may be helpful to think of πt as the probability that starting from k, the chain will be in
k′ at the fraction t of the game, even if it is not exactly the case.
Part 2. From the results in part 1, we deduce the following properties about the limit of the
cumulated payoff and the vector of limit values v∗ ∈ RK :
• Setting g∗(k) := limλ→0 g(k, x
1
λ(k), x
2
λ(k)) for each k ∈ K, one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) =
∫ t
0
〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds
• For any relevant cycle C and any k, k′ ∈ C one has: v∗(k) = v∗(k′).
• The weak constant payoff property holds for any initial state belonging to an absorbing cycle,
that is, a relevant cycle where the chain stays more that ⌊λ−1+ 12N ⌋ stages.
• If the weak constant property holds for any initial state that belongs to a relevant cycle, it
holds for any initial state (that is, for any initial transient state as well).
In view of the previous results we restrict our attention to initial states which belong to recurrent
cycles, that is, relevant cycles that are not absorbing. These cycles are left after a positive fraction
of the game.
6
3 THE WEAK CONSTANT PAYOFF PROPERTY
Part 3. By restricting our attention to an initial state belonging to a recurrent cycle, we then
establish two useful formulae: one for v∗ and one for Π := limλ→0 λ(Id− (1− λ)Qλ)−1 (note that
Π = limt→1Πt). Building on a variational inequality recently established by Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga
and Zavidovique [6] in the framework of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, we then prove two variational
inequalities satisfied by the discounted values vλ and vλ′ for 0 < λ
′ < λ, and an explicit expression
for the derivative of λ 7→ vλ, in terms of a family of discounted occupation measures. Taking λ to
0, and using the previous results, we obtain the following important invariance property:
Πv∗ = v∗
This is the cornerstone for deducing that, for any recurrent cycle C, the average payoff obtained
inside the cycle before leaving it, and the expected payoff on the exit date, are both equal to v∗(k),
for any k ∈ C.
Part 4. The previous invariance properties yield the following stronger invariance property
πtv
∗ = v∗, for all t ∈ [0, 1]
This means that as λ vanishes, v∗(kϕ(λ,t)) converges to a real-valued martingale. We conclude the
proof by combining this property with a continuous-time version of the Shapley equation:
v∗ =
∫ t
0
πsg
∗ds+ (1− t)πtv∗
Part 5. We prove a technical lemma for a family of bounded, real sequences (uλm)m, indexed
by λ ∈ (0, 1]. As λ vanishes, the convergence of uλφ(λ,t) to 0, for all t ∈ [0, 1), is equivalent to the
convergence to 0 of the discounted sums
∑
m≥1 δλ(1 − δλ)m−1uλm to 0, for all δ > 0. Applying
this property to the sequence of expected values Ek
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[vλ(km)] of a stochastic game, we obtain an
equivalent formulation of the strong constant payoff property in terms of the values of δλ-discounted
single-player games, namely, their convergence to 0.
Part 6. For each initial state k¯ ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1] and δ > 0, we define a single-player optimization
problem MDPk¯,δ,λ as follows:
• the set of states is K
• for every m ≥ 1, the current state km is observed, in particular the initial state k¯
• the action set depends on the current state and on λ: the action set at km = k is the set of opti-
mal strategy profiles of the I×J-matrix game (λg(k, i, j)+(1−λ)∑k′∈K q(k′|k, i, j)vλ(k′))i,j .
• the payoff function depends on k¯ and λ, but not on actions: gλ(k) := vλ(k)− vλ(k¯)
• the discount factor is δλ
Using the semi-algebraic approach introduced by Bewley and Kohlberg [1], we show that this
Markov decision process admits optimal stationary strategies λ 7→ zλ that admit an expansion in
Puiseux series in some neighborhood of 0. Yet, by construction, zλ = (x
1
λ, x
2
λ) is an optimal Puiseux
strategy profile of the original game so that, by the weak constant payoff property established earlier,
the payoff vanishes as λ tends to 0. It follows that the value wδλ(k¯) of the MDP with initial state
k¯ converges to 0 as λ vanishes, for any δ > 0, which concludes the proof.
3 The weak constant payoff property
The aim of this section, divided into 4 parts, is to prove the following result.
Theorem 3.1 (Weak constant payoff property). Fix an initial state k ∈ K and let λ 7→ (x1λ, x2λ)
be an optimal Puiseux strategy profile. Then, uniformly on t ∈ [0, 1]:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) = tv
∗(k)
Throughout this section, let λ 7→ (x1λ, x2λ) denote some fixed optimal Puiseux strategy profile. For
each initial state k, the probability over the set of histories (K × I × J)N induced by this strategy
profile is denoted by Pkλ. The corresponding expectation will be denoted by E
k
λ.
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3.1 Part 1: Perturbed Markov chains
By stationarity4, for each λ ∈ (0, 1], the sequence of states (km)m≥1 follows a Markov chain over
the state space K. Let Qλ ∈ RK×K denote its transition matrix, which is explicitly given by:
Qλ(k, k
′) :=
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
x1λ(k, i)x
2
λ(k, j)q(k
′|k, i, j), ∀k, k′ ∈ K
Clearly, the transition function λ 7→ Qλ inherits the same regularity as the strategies, namely
Qλ(k, k
′) admits an expansion in Puiseux series in (0, λ0) for each k, k
′ ∈ K, with the same common
denominator N ∈ N∗. Then, for each (k, k′) ∈ K2, either Qλ(k, k′) = 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ0) or there
exists c(k, k′) > 0 and e(k, k′) ∈ {m/N, m ∈ N} such that as λ goes to 0:
Qλ(k, k
′) ∼ c(k, k′)λe(k,k′) + o(λe(k,k′)+ 12N ) (6)
This property ensures that any ratio of finite products of entries of Qλ converges in [0,+∞]. Thus,
the theory developed by Freidlin and Wentzell [7] for perturbed dynamical systems applies5 and one
can describe the asymptotic behavior of the family of Markov chains (Qλ)λ as λ vanishes in terms
of the so-called hierarchy of cycles (see below, Section 3.1.1). This idea is to consider the chains
not only at infinity, but also at infinities of different orders: though the asymptotic behavior of a
fixed Markov chain is well captured by studying the law of km as m→ +∞, a good understanding
of the asymptotic behavior of (Qλ)λ is obtained by studying the law of k⌊αλ−d⌋ as λ vanishes, for
all α > 0 and suitable d > 0.
3.1.1 Cycle decomposition
Let us briefly recall some useful results about what Freidlin and Wentzell call the hierarchy of
cycles. For more details on the results presented in this section, we refer the reader to Trouve´ [19]
or to Catoni and Cerf [4] who studied more closely the case of finite Markov chains in a simulated
annealing framework. In our case, we deal with what is known as the “constant cooling schedule”,
which is a particular case of the latter. We invite the reader which is familiar with this theory to
jump directly to the formal definitions.
Informally, a cycle is either a singleton (i.e. every state is a cycle by convention) or a set of
states in which the chain stays an exponentially distributed number of stages, going back and forth
an exponentially distributed number of times between any pair of states before leaving the cycle.
To grasp the intuition behind this decomposition, we consider an example; formal definitions will
be given right after.
Illustration
Let (Rλ)λ be a family of stochastic matrices over K = {1, 2, 3, 4} with the property that λ 7→
Rλ(k, k
′) is a Puiseux series for each (k, k′) ∈ K2, over some common interval (0, λ0). As the
asymptotic properties of the chain are fully determined by the leading terms of these series (see
Solan and Vieille [15, Theorem 2]), we will only specify these terms:
Rλ ∼λ→0

1/2 1/6 1/6 1/6
0 1 5λ1/3 λ2/3
0 5λ1/3 1 λ2/3
λ2/3 0 0 1

The different orders of the Markov chain can be illustrated as follows:
4Of the model, and of the fixed strategy profile.
5The family (Qλ)λ is completely asymptotically regular, in the words of Freidlin and Wentzell.
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1 2
34
1
2
1
6
λ1/3λ1/3
1
6
λ2/3
λ2/3
1
6
λ2/3
The common denominator of all the Puiseux expansions (or, rather, of all their leading terms) is
N = 3. Hence, in order to understand the asymptotic behavior of the family (Rλ)λ it is appropriate
to consider the chain at different time-scales, that is after a number of stages of order λ−m/3, for
m = 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . Before we describe the cycles let us point out that, in addition to the subset of
states composing it, each cycle can be described by the following 5 characteristics:
• Exit height
• Exit rate
• Exit distribution
• Mixing height
• Mixing distribution
The exit height specifies the order of the number of stages that the chain spends in the cycle before
leaving it; the exit rate gives the parameter of the exponentially distributed time of escape; the
exit distribution is the (asymptotic) probability over the state space on the exit date. Similarly,
the mixing height specifies the order of the number of stages that the chain needs to visit all the
states in the cycle; the mixing distribution is the (asymptotic) frequency of visits to each of these
states before leaving the cycle. Both exit distributions and mixing distributions will be considered
as elements of ∆(K). One crucial aspect about these characteristics is that they do not depend
on the initial state within the cycle. Another one is the fact that states that belong to the same
cycle will behave like “an aggregated state” at any order strictly higher than their mixing height.
It is also convenient to point out that both exit heights and mixing heights will be non-negative
multiples of 1/N .
We are now ready to study the hierarchy of cycles, and their characteristics. By convention, each
state is a cycle. The exit height E(k) ≥ 0 of state k is the least non-negative real number such that
the probability of leaving k in less than ⌊λ−α⌋ stages tends to 1 as λ vanishes. Clearly, one has
E(1) = 0, E(2) = E(3) = 1/3 and E(4) = 2/3. The exit rates (rk)k and exit distributions (pk)k
are r1 = ln 2, r2 = r3 = 5 and r4 = 1, and p1 = (0,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ), p2 = (0, 0, 1, 0), p3 = (0, 1, 0, 0) and
p4 = (1, 0, 0, 0).
In order to compute the rest of the cycles it is convenient to consider the chain after a number of
stages of order λ−m/N−ε, for some ε ∈ (0, 1/N) and for all m ∈ N. The idea for such a choice is to
ensure that all transitions which occur at the order λ−m/N have already occurred (possibly a great
number of times), and that no transition occurring at order λ−(m+1)/N has occurred yet. In the
sequel, we will take ε = 12N .
Time-scale 0. After ⌊λ−1/6⌋ stages, only transitions from state 1 occur (i.e. the probability of
such transitions converges to 1 as λ vanishes). Consequently, there are no new cycles at this time-
scale.
Time-scale 1/3. After ⌊λ−1/3−1/6⌋ stages, transitions between states 2 and 3 occur as well. More
precisely, the number of times that the chain goes back and forth between these two states before
leaving the set {2, 3} is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean λ−1/3. Hence the
set C := {2, 3} is a cycle. As we did for states, one can define the exit height, exit rate and exit
distribution for any cycle. Clearly, E(C) = 2/3 and pC = (0, 0, 0, 1). The order of the number
of stages after which some states “merge into a cycle” is precisely the mixing height of the cycle.
Hence, the mixing height of C is 1/3. As states 2 and 3 are evenly visited before leaving the
cycle, its mixing distribution µC is given by µC = (0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0). The exit rate can now be computed,
averaging the exit rates of each state in the cycle with respect to the mixing distribution. We thus
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obtain r(C) = 1.
Time-scale 2/3. After ⌊λ−2/3−1/6⌋ stages, transitions between cycle C = {2, 3} and state 4
occur, and so do transitions between state 4 and 1. Hence, states 1, 2, 3 and 4 merge into a
new cycle C′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. As C′ is never left, we set by convention E(C′) = +∞ and let the exit
distribution undefined. The mixing height of C′ is 2/3. The computation of the mixing distribution
is less straightforward here. Nonetheless, let us make the two remarks:
(a) States 2 and 3 are visited with the same frequency, since these states have already merged
into an evenly visited cycle.
(b) From the relation E(1) = 0 < E(C) = E(4) = 2/3 one can deduce that µC′(1) = 0 and
µC′(k) > 0 for k = 2, 3, 4. Indeed, on the one hand state 1 is left very quickly in comparison
to the other states in C′ so that the frequency of visits to it tends to 0; on the other hand,
the number of visits to 4 and to C (and thus to 2 and 3) is of the same order.
Further time-scales. As all states have merged into one cycle, there cannot be any new cycle.
Also, once states have merged into a cycle, they behave as a single aggregated state. In particular,
the relative frequency of visits to the states in the cycle remains constant. For instance, between
stages 1 and ⌊λ−1−1/6⌋, the asymptotic frequency of visits to a state k is µC′(k), regardless of the
initial state. As the weights of these stages tend to 1, we obtain that:
lim
λ→0
∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Rm−1λ = (1, 1, 1, 1)TµC′
Another remarkable fact about cycles is their structure of valued tree, where the value stands
for the mixing heights:
0
1/3
2/3
1
1 2 3 4
C
C′
The cycles decomposition of our example and their characteristics are summarized in the fol-
lowing table:
cycles exit height exit rate exit distribution mixing height mixing distribution
{1} 0 ln 2 (0, 13 , 13 , 13 ) − −
{2} 1/3 5 (0, 0, 1, 0) − −
{3} 1/3 5 (0, 1, 0, 0) − −
{4} 2/3 1 (1, 0, 0, 0) − −
{2, 3} 2/3 1 (0, 0, 0, 1) 1/3 (0, 12 , 12 , 0)
{1, 2, 3, 4} +∞ − − 2/3 (0, 15 , 15 , 35 )
Formal definitions
We are now ready to provide formal definitions. For any set A ⊂ K, we denote by
τ(A) := inf{m ≥ 1, km /∈ A}
the first exit from A. The regularity of (Qλ)λ (i.e. property 6) ensures that for any A ⊂ K, k ∈ A
and k′ ∈ K, the following limit exists:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kτ(A) = k
′)
Indeed, an explicit expression is given for each Pkλ(kτ(A) = k
′) as the ratio of sums with positive
coefficients of finite products of entries of Qλ (see Lemma 3.3 in [7, Chapter 6]). We can now define
the notion of cycles.
10
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Definition 3.2. A cycle C is a subset of K which is either a single state or that contains at least
two states and satisfies:
lim
λ→0
logPkλ(kτ(C\{k′}) 6= k′)
logλ
> 0, ∀(k, k′) ∈ K2
In particular, one has limλ→0 P
k
λ(kτ(C\{k′}) = k
′) = 1. That is, starting from state k ∈ C, the chain
reaches k′ before leaving the cycle, with a probability that goes to 1 as λ vanishes.
As we already illustrated in the example, the set of cycles has the structure of a valued tree for
the set inclusion, with single states as leaves [4, Proposition 4.4]. In particular, any two cycles are
either disjoint or one contains the other. Cycles which are not single states can be better understood
thanks to the following characterization which justifies the name “cycle” [4, Proposition 4.3]: C is
a cycle containing at least two states if and only if for all k, k′ ∈ C, k 6= k′, the number NC(k, k′)
of round trips from k to k′ performed by the chain starting from k and before leaving C satisfies:
lim
λ→0
− logE
k
λ [NC(k, k
′)]
logλ
> 0
Cycles can be obtained sequentially (see Trouve´ [19, section 2.2] for an explicit algorithm) by
looking at the Markov chain at different time-scales as illustrated in the previous example. Let us
provide now the formal definitions for the exit height, exit rate, exit distribution, mixing height
and mixing distribution of a cycle, neither of which depends on the initial position of the chain
within the cycle. Let C be a cycle, as already noticed before. Recall that τ(C) := inf{m ≥ 1, km /∈
C} ∈ N∗ ∪ {+∞} is the first exit from C.
Definition 3.3. We say that E(C) ∈ [0,+∞] is the exit height of C if for every ε > 0 and k ∈ C
one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(λ
−E(C)+ε ≤ τ(C) ≤ λ−E(C)−ε) = 1 (7)
Definition 3.4. Assume that E(C) < +∞. We say that rC ∈ (0,+∞) is the exit rate of C if for
any α ≥ 0, one has
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(τ(C) ≥ αλ−E(C)) = e−αrC (8)
Definition 3.5. Assume that E(C) < +∞. We say that pC ∈ ∆(K) is the exit distribution of C
if for any k ∈ C one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kτ(C) = · ) = pC( · )
Definition 3.6. We say that M(C) ∈ [0,+∞) is the mixing height of a cycle C containing at least
two states if it is the smallest positive real number such that for any ε > 0 and k, k′ ∈ C, k 6= k′
one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(∃m < min(τ(C), λ−M(C)−ε) such that km = k′) = 1 (9)
Definition 3.7. We say that µC ∈ ∆(K) is a mixing distribution of a cycle C if for any function
f : (0, 1]→ N satisfying limλ→0 Pkλ(λ−M(C) ≪ f(λ) < τ(C)) = 1 one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kf(λ) = · ) = µC( · )
where we write a(λ)≪ b(λ) if limλ→0 a(λ)/b(λ) = 0.
N.B. Mixing distributions may not be uniquely defined. For cycles having d ≥ 2 mixing distribu-
tions µ1C , . . . , µ
d
C , we set µC :=
1
d
∑d
ℓ=1 µ
ℓ
C . This way, the unique mixing distribution represents
the frequency of visits to the states in the cycle before leaving it.
Before we proceed, let us provide some comments on these definitions:
1. Exit and mixing heights satisfy the following dichotomy: either E(C) = 0, which can only
occur if C is a singleton, or 0 ≤M(C) < E(C).
2. The mixing distribution is not defined for singleton-cycles C = {k}. It is just a matter of
convention. Later on, it will be convenient to set µk = δk for such cycles, as far asQλ(k, k) > 0
for all λ ∈ (0, λ0).
3. The exit rate is not defined in the following two cases:
(a) C = {k} is a singleton, and is left immediately, i.e. Qλ(k, k) = 0, for all λ ∈ (0, λ0),
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(b) C is never left, i.e. Qλ(k, k
′) = 0 for all k ∈ C and k′ /∈ C, for all λ ∈ (0, λ0).
4. Mixing distributions are uniquely defined except for cycles with mixing height equal to 0 and
which are periodic. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider a family of Markov chains over
K = {1, 2, 3} whose asymptotic behavior, as λ vanishes, is given by:
Rλ ∼λ→0
0 1 √λ1 0 0
0 0 1

The cycle C := {1, 2} is such that M(C) = 0 and E(C) = 1/2, so that for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}
the functions fℓ(λ) = 2⌊λ−1/4⌋ + ℓ satisfy limλ→0 P1λ(λ−M(C) ≪ fℓ(λ) ≪ τ(C)) = 1. The
probabilities P1λ(kfℓ(λ) = · ) converge to δ1 and δ2 respectively, because of the periodicity of
the chain before leaving the cycle, and we set µC =
1
2 (δ1 + δ2) in this case. More generally,
cycles with mixing height equal to 0 and with a d-periodic behavior have exactly d mixing
distributions.
5. The mixing distribution stands for the limit frequency of visits in the sense that for any cycle
with positive exit height one has:
lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[∑τ(C)
m=1 λ(1− λ)m−11{km= · }
]
Ekλ
[∑τ(C)
m=1 λ(1 − λ)m−1
] = µC( · ) (10)
6. The exit and mixing distributions of a cycle C, when defined, are supported on K\C and C
respectively.
7. The particular form of (Qλ)λ (i.e. condition (6)) ensures that finite exit and mixing heights
are multiples of 1/N .
3.1.2 Transient states and relevant cycles
As already noticed in Section 2.1.3 (see (2)), the cumulative weights of stages 1, 2, . . . , ⌊λ−1+ 12N ⌋
tends to 0 as λ vanishes. Since mixing and exit heights are multiples of 1N , it follows that states
belonging to a cycle C of mixing height M(C) < 1− 12N , act as a single, aggregated state from the
beginning of the game. This observation motivates the introduction of relevant cycles.
Definition 3.8. A relevant cycle is
• either a single state C = {k} satisfying 1− 12N < E(C)
• or a cycle C containing more than one state and satisfying 0 ≤M(C) < 1− 12N < E(C)
A relevant cycle is recurrent if E(C) = 1, and absorbing if E(C) > 1.
N.B. For any relevant cycle C = {k} which is a singleton, we set its mixing distribution as µk := δk.
Definition 3.9. A state k ∈ K is transient if it does not belong to any relevant cycle.
Intuitively, relevant cycles are subsets of states in which the chain remains a positive fraction
of the game before (possibly) leaving them. They are relevant in the sense that they matter for
the asymptotic payoff of the game. They are obtained by cutting the valued tree of all cycles
horizontally at the height 1− 12N , and by comparing the exit heights of each cycle to 1− 12N .
Remark 3.10. Transient states and relevant cycles are cycles in the usual sense of Definition 3.2.
Note that the set of transient states may be empty. On the contrary, the finiteness of the state
space ensures the existence of at least one relevant cycle.
As these new definitions will play an important role in the sequel, let us illustrate them with an
example. Consider a transition matrix over {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} whose asymptotic behavior, as λ vanishes,
is given by 
1 λ1/4 0 λ3/4 λ3/4
λ1/4 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 λ1/2 λ
0 0 λ1/2 1 0
0 0 λ5/4 0 1

Here, N = 4, so that 1− 12N = 78 . The cycle structure and exit heights can be pictured as follows:
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0
1/4
1/2
3/4
D
1
1 2 3 4 5
A
B
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The dashed line stands for the height 78 . At this height, there are three cycles A = {1, 2}, B = {3, 4}
and {5}, with exit heights are E(A) = 3/4, E(B) = 1 and E(5) = 1. Hence B and {5} are relevant
cycles (B is recurrent and {5} is absorbing), whereas A is not relevant, so that states 1 and 2 are
transient. The cycle C is not relevant, as its mixing height is bigger than 78 .
Notation. The set of relevant cycles will be denoted by C1, . . . , CL (L ≥ 1). The set of
transient states will be denoted by TR. An important consequence of the definitions above is that
transient states and relevant cycles partition the state space, i.e:
K
disj.
= TR ∪ C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CL
Remark 3.11. The terms “transient”, “recurrent” and “absorbing” have a different meaning than
for usual Markov chains. First, transient states are not left once and for all and second, recurrent
or even absorbing cycles may be left. We have chosen to use these same words here in order
to emphasise the similarities with their traditional meaning. Indeed, the chain stays a negligible
fraction of the game on the set of transient states TR before reaching some relevant cycle, where
the chain stays a non-negligible fraction. Recurrent cycles are left before the game ends, whereas
absorbing cycles are not left before the end of the game, i.e. stage ⌊λ−1− 12N ⌋.
3.1.3 The position at any fraction t of the game
The aim of this section is to describe the asymptotic behaviour of (Qλ)λ at the fraction t ∈ [0, 1]
of the game. Recall that for any B ⊂ K, τ(B) = inf{m ≥ 1, km /∈ B} is the first exit from B and
that, as already noticed before defining the cycles, limλ→0 P
k
λ(kτ(B) = k
′) exists for all k, k′ ∈ K
and B.
We can now introduce the matrix Φ ∈ RK×L of entrance laws, and the infinitesimal generator
A ∈ RL×L. The former expresses the rapid transitions from states to relevant cycles, whereas the
latter indicates the rates at which the chain jumps from one relevant cycle to another during the
game. We set:
n(λ) := ⌊λ−1+ 12N ⌋
Definition 3.12. For any k ∈ K, the entrance law Φ(k, · ) is defined as:
Φ(k, ℓ) := lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kn(λ) ∈ Cℓ), for all ℓ = 1, . . . , L (11)
Note that, for any k ∈ K one has
Φ(k, ℓ) =
∑
k′∈Cℓ
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kτ(TR) = k
′), for all ℓ = 1, . . . , L
In particular, Φ(k, · ) is a probability over the set {1, . . . , L}. Indeed, by definition, one has
maxk∈TR E(k) ≤ 1 − 1N so that the probability that the set of transient states is left before
stage n(λ) tends to 1. Consequently, the probability that some non-transient state (and thus, the
cycle containing it) is reached before stage n(λ) tends to 1. Finally, as minℓ=1,...,LE(Cℓ) ≥ 1, the
probability that kn(λ) belongs to the same cycle that was first hit tends to 1.
A useful picture. The following picture may help the reader to visualize the decomposition
of the state space into transient states and relevant cycles:
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C1 C2 • • • CL
•
•
•
•
•
• • •
•
• •
• k
In the picture, the first relevant cycle is a recurrent cycle: the thick lines indicate the transitions
that go out from it after a number of stages of order ⌊λ−1⌋. The dashed lines stemming out
from the transient state k represent the rapid transitions from this state to the relevant cycles.
Quantitatively, the probabilities of these transitions are given by Φ(k, · ). The rate at which the
chain jumps from C1to another cycle, say C2, depends on two things: 1) the rate at which a direct
transition between the two cycles occur, and 2) the rate at which a transition from C1 to TR occurs
that leads to C2. The former is given by r1
∑
k∈C2
p1(k), the second by r1
∑
k∈TR p1(k)Φ(k, 2). As
Φ(k, 2) = 1 for all k ∈ C2, the total rate can be expressed with the following formula:
r1
∑
k∈K
p1(k)Φ(k, 2)
Definition 3.13. The infinitesimal generator A ∈ RL×L expresses the rates at which transitions
occur from one relevant cycle to another. For each 1 ≤ ℓ 6= ℓ′ ≤ L, one sets:
A(ℓ, ℓ′) :=
{
rℓ
∑
k∈K pℓ(k)Φ(k, ℓ
′) if Cℓ is a recurrent cycle
0 if Cℓ is an absorbing cycle
where rℓ and pℓ are the exit rate and exit distribution, respectively, of the cycle Cℓ.
For 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, we set:
A(ℓ, ℓ) := −
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
A(ℓ, ℓ′)
We now show that, up to a time-change and a projection matrix (namely the matrix of entrance
laws Φ), the asymptotic behavior of (Qλ)λ can be described by a continuous-time Markov chain
over {1, . . . , L} with infinitesimal generator A.
Proposition 3.14. For any t ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ K and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kϕ(λ,t) ∈ Cℓ) =
L∑
ℓ′=1
Φ(k, ℓ′)e− ln(1−t)A(ℓ′, ℓ)
Proof. Fix an initial state k ∈ K. From the definition of relevant cycles, it follows that limλ→0 Pkλ(k⌊h/λ⌋ ∈
TR) = 0, for any h > 0. Hence, by the Markov property, for any 0 < h < α one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(k⌊α/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ) = lim
λ→0
L∑
ℓ′=1
P
k
λ(k⌊h/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ′)Pkλ(k⌊α/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ | k⌊h/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ′) (12)
The result is then a direct consequence of the relation ϕ(λ, t) ∼λ→0 − ln(1 − t)/λ, which makes a
correspondence between stages 1, . . . , ⌊α/λ⌋ and the fraction 1 − e−α of the game, and of the two
following equalities, which hold for all ℓ′ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and are proven just below:
lim
h→0
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(k⌊h/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ′) = Φ(k, ℓ′) (13)
lim
h→0
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(k⌊α/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ | k⌊h/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ′) = eAα(ℓ′, ℓ) (14)
Fix 1 ≤ ℓ′ ≤ L. By definition, the exit height of every transient state is strictly smaller than 1− 12N
whereas the exit height of any relevant cycle is strictly larger. Hence, the probability that a chain
starting from k leads to Cℓ′ in n(λ) steps tends to Φ(k, ℓ
′). By definition, the exit rate r′ of Cℓ′ is
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strictly positive whenever Cℓ′ is a recurrent cycle; set r
′ = 0 if Cℓ′ is an absorbing cycle. Hence,
the probability of leaving Cℓ′ in less that h/λ steps tends to 1− e−hr′ as λ vanishes, which tends to
0 as h vanishes. This proves (13). Similarly, we prove (14) by noticing that, as the probability of
leaving Cℓ′ in less that h/λ steps tends to hr
′+o(h), the probability of leaving more than once some
relevant cycle in less than h/λ steps is bounded by maxℓ=1,...,L(hrℓ+ o(h))
2 = o(h). Consequently,
up to an error term of order o(h), in order to go from Cℓ′ to another cycle Cℓ in less than h/λ steps,
the chain needs to leave exactly once Cℓ′ and then go to Cℓ (possibly through the set of transient
states), which occurs precisely with probability
(hr′ + o(h))
∑
k∈K
pℓ′(k)Φ(k, ℓ) = A(ℓ
′, ℓ)h+ o(h)
Similarly, up to an error term of order o(h), in order to still be in Cℓ′ after h/λ steps, the chain
needs either not to leave the cycle at all, or leave it exactly once and then “land back” in Cℓ′ , which
occurs with probability 1 − hr′ + hr′∑k∈K pℓ′(k)Φ(k, ℓ′) + o(h). We thus obtain, for any α > 0
and small h:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(k⌊(α+h)/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ′ | k⌊α/λ⌋ ∈ Cℓ) =
{
A(ℓ, ℓ′)h+ o(h) if ℓ 6= ℓ′
1 +A(ℓ, ℓ)h+ o(h) otherwise
which is equivalent to (14).
Remark 3.15. Proposition 3.14 is reminiscent of [5, Theorem 4.3] which establishes that, in the
framework of analytically perturbed continuous-time Markov chains, the asymptotic behavior of
(Qλ)λ at time α/λ
d (d > 0) can be uniformly approximated by a continuous-time Markov chain
(Yα)α>0 with generator A and projection matrix Φ. In our notation, Cordech, Willsky, Sastry and
Castanon 1983 establish that for all ε > 0 and T , for all k ∈ K and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L:
lim
λ→0
sup
α∈[ε,T ]
‖Pkλ(k⌊α/λd⌋ ∈ Cℓ)− (ΦeAα)(k, ℓ)‖ = 0
In view of Proposition 3.14, for any initial state k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1], we can now define the
asymptotic position of the state at the fraction t of the game Γλ(k) as λ vanishes. For every
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, let µℓ denote the mixing distribution of the cycle Cℓ. Recall that µℓ is well-defined
(with the convention that µℓ = δk if C = {k}) and is supported on Cℓ. Let M ∈ RL×K be such
that M(ℓ, k) := µℓ(k) for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L and k ∈ K.
Definition 3.16. For any time t ∈ [0, 1), the matrix πt ∈ RK×K of positions at time t is defined
by:
πt := Φe
− ln(1−t)AM
Interpretation
1. For any cycle C, any k ∈ K and any t ∈ (0, 1) one has:
πt(k, C) :=
∑
k′∈C
πt(k, k
′) = lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kϕ(λ,t) ∈ C)
2. The relation
πt(k, · ) = lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kϕ(λ,t) = · ), ∀t ∈ (0, 1)
holds for every state k ∈ K, unless k belongs to a relevant cycle C with M(C) = 0 and which
has a periodic behavior before n(λ). In this case, only the following “relaxed form” holds:
πt(k, · ) = lim
λ→0
1
d
d∑
ℓ=1
P
k
λ(kϕ(λ,t)+ℓ = · )
where d is the minimum common multiple of all periods. Note that taking d = |K|! one has
an expression which holds for any initial state k ∈ K of the game.
3. The mapping πt : K → ∆(K) can be understood as follows. First, Φ takes the initial state
to a probability over the relevant cycles. Then, up to a time-change α 7→ 1− e−α, the chain
evolves like a chain in continuous-time with generator A. Hence, the matrix eAα maps initial
probabilities over the relevant cycles at time 0, to probabilities over the relevant cycles at time
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1− e−α. Finally, M maps probabilities over relevant cycles to the corresponding frequency of
visits to the states inside the cycle. Thus:
πt : K
Φ−→ ∆(L) e
− ln(1−t)A)
−→ ∆(L) M−→ ∆(K)
Note that Φ and M describe very rapid phenomena compared to the transitions between
relevant cycles, described by A. Explicitly, for any k, k′ ∈ K one has:
πt(k, k
′) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ(k, ℓ)
L∑
ℓ′=1
e− ln(1−t)A(ℓ, ℓ′)
∑
k′∈K
M(ℓ′, k′)
Lemma 3.17. The following properties hold:
1. For any cycle C and any k, k′ ∈ C one has πt(k, · ) = πt(k′, · ) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
2. For any selection (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ C1 × · · · × CL of states in the cycles, and any k ∈ K:
πt(k, · ) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ(k, ℓ)πt(kℓ, · ), ∀t ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. The first relation follows from the definition of πt, since Φ(k, · ) = Φ(k′, · ) for any pair of
states k, k′ belonging to the same relevant cycle. The second follows from conditioning at stage
n(λ) and letting λ to 0. Indeed, as in (12), for any relevant cycle C the definition of Φ and of cycle
yield:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ(kϕ(λ,t) ∈ C) = lim
λ→0
L∑
ℓ=1
P
k
λ(kn(λ) ∈ Cℓ)Pkλ(kϕ(λ,t) ∈ C | kn(λ) ∈ Cℓ)
=
L∑
ℓ=1
φ(k, ℓ) lim
λ→0
P
kℓ(kϕ(λ,t) ∈ C)
Proposition 3.14 and the definition of mixing distributions imply the following result:
Corollary 3.18. For any t ∈ [0, 1], one has
lim
λ→0
ϕ(λ,t)∑
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ =
∫ t
0
πsds
Proof. By Proposition 3.14 and the definition of πt, for all α, h > 0 one has:
lim
λ→0
⌊(α+h)/λ⌋∑
m=⌊α/λ⌋
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ = e−απ1−e−αh+ o(h)
Hence, for all α > 0:
lim
λ→0
⌊α/λ⌋∑
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ =
∫ α
0
e−sπ1−e−sds
=
∫ 1−e−α
0
πsds,
where the second equality stems from a change of variables. From this equality, and the fact that
for all t ∈ (0, 1), ϕ(λ, t) is equivalent to − ln(1 − t)/λ as λ vanishes, one deduces the result. The
result is obvious for t = 0; it is obtained by continuity for t = 1.
3.2 Part 2: The cumulated payoff
We studied in Section 3.1 the asymptotic behavior of
∑ϕ(t,λ)
m=1 λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ , where Qλ is the
transition matrix of the Markov chain induced by the optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x1λ, x
2
λ).
It is now easy to deduce some properties on the asymptotic behavior of the cumulated payoff
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γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) as λ vanishes. For that, we introduce the vector payoff gλ induced by (x
1
λ, x
2
λ) by
setting:
gλ(k) :=
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
x1λ(k, i)x
2
λ(k, j)g(k, i, j), ∀k ∈ K
Let us denote its limit by g∗ := limλ→0 g
∗
λ, which exists by the choice of (x
1
λ, x
2
λ). For any w ∈ RK ,
let 〈ν, w〉 =∑k∈K ν(k)w(k) denote the scalar product in RK .
Remark 3.19. Note that, by stationarity, every time state k′ is visited, the expected payoff to
Player 1 is given by gλ(k
′). Hence, for any k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1]:
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) = 〈
∑ϕ(t,λ)
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ (k, · ), g∗λ〉
The boundedness of both terms inside the scalar product implies then:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) = 〈 lim
λ→0
∑ϕ(t,λ)
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ (k, · ), g∗〉
The following result is thus a direct consequence of Corollary 3.18 and Remark 3.19.
Lemma 3.20. For any k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) =
∫ t
0
〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds
As the state space is partitioned into transient states and relevant cycles, we have the following
dichotomy: either the initial state is transient or it belongs to one (and exactly one) relevant cycle.
The following result will allow us to reduce our problem to initial states which belong to a recurrent
cycle.
Lemma 3.21. Let Cℓ be some relevant cycle. Then:
(i) For any k, k′ ∈ Cℓ one has v∗(k) = v∗(k′).
(ii) If Cℓ is absorbing, then for every k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has limλ→0 γλ(k, x1λ, x2λ; t) = tv∗(k).
(iii) For any (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ C1 × · · · × CL and k ∈ K one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ(k, ℓ) lim
λ→0
γλ(kℓ, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t), for all t ∈ [0, 1]
In particular, v∗(k) =
∑L
ℓ=1Φ(k, ℓ)v
∗(kℓ).
Proof. (i) Let k ∈ Cℓ. The optimality of the strategy profile (x1λ, x2λ)λ and Lemma 3.20 yield
v∗(k) = lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; 1) =
∫ 1
0
〈πt(k, · ), g∗〉dt
As already noticed (see Lemma 3.17), for any k, k′ ∈ Cℓ one has πt(k, · ) = πt(k′, · ), so that the
equality v∗(k) = v∗(k′) follows.
(ii) For every k ∈ Cℓ one has Φ(k, · ) = δℓ. If, moreover, Cℓ is absorbing, then A(ℓ, · ) = 0. It
follows that πt(k, k
′) =M(ℓ, k′) = µℓ(k
′) for every t and k′, where µℓ is the mixing distribution of
Cℓ. Indeed, the cycle Cℓ is never left and the position at time t is entirely described by the mixing
distribution. By Lemma 3.20 one has limλ→0 γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) = t〈µℓ, g∗〉 for all t, and the result
follows from the fact that limλ→0 γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; 1) = v
∗(k) by the optimality of (x1λ, x
2
λ)λ.
(iii) This result follows directly from Lemmas 3.17 and 3.20. The particular case corresponds
simply to t = 1.
From Lemma 3.21 one gets some valuable information about the constant payoff property.
• By (i), the limit value is independent of the initial state, within every relevant cycle.
• By (ii), the weak constant payoff property (i.e. Theorem 3.1) holds for initial state belonging
to an absorbing cycle.
• By (iii), the weak constant payoff property holds as far as it holds for any initial state
belonging to some relevant cycle. Together with the previous comment, it follows that the
proof of Theorem 3.1 reduces to the proof of this result for initial states belonging to a
recurrent cycle.
In view of these remarks, from now on, we will focus on initial states belonging to a recurrent cycle.
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3.3 Part 3: Values and occupation measures
In this section, we start by establishing two useful formulas relating the limit value v∗ and the
matrix of limit occupation measures Π (see Definition 3.22 below), for each recurrent cycle. Second,
we prove some variational inequalities satisfied by the discounted values (vλ)λ, in terms of some
discounted occupation measures Πλ,λ,λ′ (see Definition 3.25 below). Third, we deduce from these
two results some important invariance properties satisfied by the limit value and the occupation
measure.
3.3.1 Two useful formulas
Throughout this section, let C be a fixed recurrent cycle and let r > 0, p ∈ ∆(K) and µ ∈ ∆(K)
denote, respectively, its exit rate, exit distribution and mixing distribution. The aim of this section
is to relate these quantities to the limit value v∗(k) of any state k ∈ C and to the limit occupation
measure, defined as follows.
Definition 3.22. The limit occupation matrix Π ∈ RK×K is defined by:
Π := lim
λ→0
∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1Qm−1λ
The existence of this limit is a particular case of Corollary 3.18, which implies that Π =
∫ 1
0 πtdt =
Φ(Id−A)−1M . For any k ∈ K, we denote by Πk ∈ ∆(K) the k-th row of Π. It represents the limit
discounted occupation time for the Markov chain (Qλ)λ starting from state k, that is:
Πk(k′) = lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−11{km=k′}
]
For any ν ∈ ∆(K), let νΠ ∈ ∆(K) denote the matrix product ∑k∈K ν(k)Πk.
Proposition 3.23. For any k ∈ C:
(i) v∗(k) =
1
1 + r
〈µ, g∗〉+ r
1 + r
〈p, v∗〉
(ii) Πk =
1
1 + r
µ+
r
1 + r
pΠ
Proof. Let τ := inf{m ≥ 1, km /∈ C} be the exit time from C, and let k ∈ C. The stationarity of
the strategies and the strong Markov property imply that for every function f : K → R one has:
E
k
λ
[ ∑
m≥1
λ(1−λ)m−1f(km)
]
= Ekλ
[ τ∑
m=1
λ(1−λ)m−1f(km)
]
+Ekλ
[
(1−λ)τEkτλ
[ ∑
m≥1
λ(1−λ)m−1f(km)
]]
(15)
Let us compute the limit of the two terms in the right-hand side of (15), as λ vanishes. By the
definition of inverse clock ϕ and of the exit rate r, for all t ∈ (0, 1) one has:
lim
λ→0
P
k
λ
(∑τ
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−1 ≥ t
)
= lim
λ→0
P
k
λ (τ ≥ ϕ(λ, t)) = (1− t)r
Hence, the random variable whose law is
∑τ
m=1 λ(1−λ)m−1 under Pkλ converges in law to a random
variable with density r(1 − s)r−11s∈[0,1]ds. By boundedness, this implies
lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[∑τ
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−1
]
=
∫ 1
0
sr(1 − s)r−1ds = 1
1 + r
The definition of the mixing distribution yields:
lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[ τ∑
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−1f(km)
]
=
1
1 + r
〈µ, f〉
Similarly, the definition of the exit distribution implies:
lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[
(1 − λ)τEkτλ
[ ∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1f(km)
]]
=
r
1 + r
〈
p,E
(.)
λ
[ ∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1f(km)
]〉
Both formulas follow from particular choices of the function f . Indeed, (i) is obtained by replacing
f with g∗ (see Remark 3.19) and (ii) by replacing f with (1{ ·=k′})k∈K .
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3.3.2 A variational inequality
Let us start by a technical transportation lemma for discounted averages of real, bounded sequences
(am)m≥1. It establishes a relation between
∑
m≥1 λ(1 − λ)m−1am and a convex combination of
partial sums
∑N
m=1 λ
′(1 − λ′)m−1am, N ≥ 1, for any two discount factors 0 < λ′ < λ < 1.
Lemma 3.24. Let 0 < λ′ < λ < 1 and r := λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′) and, for all m ≥ 1, let wm = λ−λ
′
1−λ′
(
1−λ
1−λ′
)m−1
.
Then, for all real, bounded sequences (am)m≥1:
∑
m≥1
wm
m−1∑
ℓ=1
λ′(1 − λ′)ℓ−1aℓ = r
∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−1am (16)
Proof. It is enough to show that, for each ℓ ≥ 1, the coefficients of aℓ in the left-hand and right-
hand sides coincide. Set Wℓ :=
∑
k≥ℓ wk for all ℓ ≥ 1 so that wℓ =Wℓ −Wℓ+1 for all ℓ ≥ 1. In the
left-hand side expression, aℓ appears as far as m− 1 ≥ ℓ, and always multiplied by λ′(1 − λ′)ℓ−1.
Thus, the coefficient for aℓ is λ
′(1 − λ′)ℓ−1Wℓ+1. On the right-hand side, the coefficient for aℓ is
trivially equal to λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′)λ(1− λ)ℓ−1 = λ
′
1−λ′ (1− λ)ℓ. The result then follows from the choice of w:
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1Wℓ+1 = λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1
∑
k≥ℓ+1
λ− λ′
1− λ′
(
1− λ
1− λ′
)k−1
= λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1λ− λ
′
1− λ′
∑
k≥ℓ
(
1− λ
1− λ′
)k
= λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1λ− λ
′
1− λ′
(
1− λ
1− λ′
)ℓ
1− λ′
λ− λ′
=
λ′
1− λ′ (1 − λ)
ℓ
We are now ready to apply this result to stochastic games. To do so, let us start by defining a
family of occupation measures.
Definition 3.25. For any k ∈ K and λ, λ′ ∈ (0, 1] let Πkλ,λ′,λ′′ ∈ ∆(K) be the occupation measure
induced by the optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x1λ′ , x
2
λ′′ ) in the game Γλ(k), that is:
Πkλ,λ′,λ′′ := E
k
x1
λ′
,x2
λ′′
[∑
m≥1
λ(1 − λ)m−11{km= · }
]
Let Πλ,λ′,λ′′ ∈ RK×K denote the vector of measures.
Lemma 3.26. The function (λ, λ′, λ′′) 7→ Πλ,λ′,λ′′ is continuous on (0, λ0)3.
Proof. Recall that λ0 > 0 is such that all the functions λ 7→ x1λ(k, i) and λ 7→ x2λ(k, j) have a
Puiseux series expansion on (0, λ0), for all (k, i, j). Let Qλ′,λ′′ denote the transition matrix of the
Markov chain (km)m≥1 induced by (x
1
λ′ , x
2
λ′′). Hence, by definition:
Πλ,λ′,λ′′ = λ(Id− (1− λ)Qλ′,λ′′)−1
The continuity of the map (λ, λ′, λ′′) 7→ Πλ,λ′,λ′′ follows from the continuity of (λ′, λ′′) 7→ Qλ′,λ′′
and the invertibility of Id− (1−λ)Qλ′,λ′′ , which holds because this matrix is diagonally dominant,
for any λ > 0.
Remark 3.27. Note that Π = limλ→0 Πλ,λ,λ, so that in particular the limit exists on the diagonal.
The following result relates the discounted payoff for two different discount factors λ and λ′ in
terms of the occupation measure Πλ,λ,λ′ and the discounted values. It will be useful in the sequel.
Proposition 3.28. Let 0 < λ′ < λ < 1. Define a strategy σ1 for Player 1 in Γλ′(k) as follows:
given a random variable X with geometric distribution of parameter 1−λ1−λ′ , play x
1
λ at stages m =
1, . . . , X − 1, then switch to x1λ′ . Then
γλ′(k, σ
1, x2λ′ ) =
λ′(1 − λ)
λ(1− λ′)γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ′) +
λ− λ′
λ(1 − λ′) 〈Π
k
λ,λ,λ′ , vλ′ 〉
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N.B. The weights λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′) and
λ−λ′
λ(1−λ′) in Proposition 3.28 are positive and add up to 1.
Proof. On the one hand, by the definition of σ1, conditional on {X = m} the payoff after stage
m is given by (1 − λ′)m−1vλ′(km). That is, by stationarity of the payoff, optimality of the profile
(x1λ′ , x
2
λ′ ) and the Markov property:
E
k
σ1,x2
λ′
[∑
k≥m
λ′(1− λ′)k−1gk |X = m
]
= (1− λ′)m−1Ekσ1,x2
λ′
[vλ′ (km) |X = m]
On the other hand, again by the definition of σ1, conditional on {X = m} the players have used
the strategies (x1λ, x
2
λ′ ) at stages 1, . . . ,m − 1. Thus, the distributions of g1, . . . , gm−1 and km are
the ones induced by (x1λ, x
2
λ′ ). Thus, for all ℓ = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and f : K → R:
E
k
σ1,x2
λ′
[f(kℓ) |X = m] = Ekx1λ,x2λ′ [f(kℓ)] .
Thus, setting Gm := E
k
x1λ,x
2
λ′
[gm] and Vm = E
k
x1λ,x
2
λ′
[vλ′(km)], one has:
E
k
σ1,x2
λ′
[∑m−1
ℓ=1
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1gℓ |X = m
]
=
∑m−1
ℓ=1
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1Gℓ
E
k
σ1,x2
λ′
[∑
ℓ≥m
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1gℓ |X = m
]
= (1− λ′)m−1Vm
Consequently:
γλ′(k, σ
1, x2λ′) =
∑
m≥1
P(X = m)
m−1∑
ℓ=1
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1Gℓ +
∑
m≥1
P(X = m)(1− λ′)m−1Vm
Let us now rewrite the two terms in the right-hand side. For the first term, by Lemma 3.24, letting
r := λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′) one has:
∑
m≥1
P(X = m)
m−1∑
ℓ=1
λ′(1− λ′)ℓ−1Gℓ = r
∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1Gm = rγλ(k, x1λ, x2λ′ )
For the second term, note that P(X = m)(1 − λ′)m−1 = (1 − r)λ(1 − λ)m−1 for all m ≥ 1. Hence,
summation yields:∑
m≥1
P(X = m)(1−λ′)m−1Vm = (1− r)Ekx1λ,x2λ′
[∑
m≥1
λ(1− λ)m−1vλ′(km)
]
= (1− r)〈Πkλ,λ,λ′ , vλ′〉
which concludes the proof.
The main consequence of Proposition 3.28 is that it allows to derive some variational inequalities
satisfied by the discounted values, as well as an explicit expression for its derivative.
Proposition 3.29. The following relations hold for all 0 < λ′ < λ and k ∈ K:
(i) vλ′(k) ≥ (1− λ)λ
′
(1− λ′)λvλ(k) +
λ− λ′
(1 − λ′)λ 〈Π
k
λ,λ,λ′ , vλ′〉
(ii) vλ′(k) ≤ (1− λ)λ
′
(1− λ′)λvλ(k) +
λ− λ′
(1 − λ′)λ 〈Π
k
λ,λ′,λ, vλ′〉
(iii)
∂
∂λ
vλ(k) =
1
λ(1− λ)
(〈Πkλ,λ,λ, vλ〉 − vλ(k)), for all λ ∈ (0, λ0)
Recall that the weights λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′) and
λ−λ′
λ(1−λ′) are positive and add up to 1.
Remark 3.30. This inequality is inspired from Lemma 3.7 in [6]. Though this last piece of work
deals with a quite different topic, it turns out that an analogy can be made between solutions of
discounted Hamilton-Jacobi equations and the family of values (vλ)λ.
Proof. Set r = λ
′(1−λ)
λ(1−λ′) as before, so that 1− r = λ−λ
′
λ(1−λ′) , and let k be some initial state.
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(i) By the definition of σ1, x1λ′ , x
1
λ and x
2
λ′ , Proposition 3.28 yields:
vλ′(k) ≥ γλ′(k, σ1, x2λ′)
= rγλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ′ ) + (1 − r)〈Πkλ,λ,λ′ , vλ′ 〉
≥ rvλ(k) + (1 − r)〈Πkλ,λ,λ′ , vλ′ 〉
(ii) Multiplying the payoff by −1, exchanging players’ roles and applying the previous inequality
yields the result.
(iii) Rearranging the terms in (i), one has:
(vλ′ (k)− vλ(k)) (1− λ)λ
′
(1− λ′)λ ≥
λ− λ′
(1− λ′)λ
(〈Πkλ,λ,λ′ , vλ〉 − vλ′(k))
A similar relation is obtained from (ii) so that
1
λ′(1 − λ)
(〈Πkλ,λ′,λ, vλ〉 − vλ(k)) ≥ vλ′ (k)− vλ(k)λ− λ′ ≥ 1λ′(1− λ) (〈Πkλ,λ,λ′ , vλ〉 − vλ(k)) (17)
Thanks to Lemma 3.26, we have
lim
λ′→λ
Πkλ,λ,λ′ = lim
λ′→λ
Πkλ,λ′,λ = Π
k
λ,λ,λ
Taking λ′ to λ in (17) yields the result.
From Proposition 3.29 we deduce the following crucial relation between v∗ and Π.
Corollary 3.31. Πv∗ = v∗
Proof. Fix k ∈ K. By the semi-algebraic approach of Bewley and Kohlberg [1] (see Section 2.1.2),
either vλ(k) = v
∗(k) for all λ ∈ (0, λ0) or there exists c 6= 0 and e > 0 such that vλ(k) =
v∗(k) + cλe + o(λe) as λ vanishes. Hence, by Proposition 3.29 (iii), either 〈Πkλ,λ,λ, vλ〉 − vλ(k) = 0
for all λ sufficiently small or, as λ vanishes:
〈Πkλ,λ,λ, vλ〉 − vλ(k) = (1− λ)ceλe + o(λe)
In both cases, taking λ to 0 yields 〈Πk, v∗〉 = v∗(k), which proves the result.
Combining the formulas of Proposition 3.23, which hold for each recurrent cycle, and the in-
variance property established in Corollary 3.31, we prove the following result.
Corollary 3.32. Let C be a recurrent cycle with exit distribution p and mixing distribution µ.
Then, for any k ∈ C one has:
v∗(k) = 〈p, v∗〉 = 〈µ, g∗〉
Proof. Taking the scalar product in Proposition 3.23 (ii) yields:
〈Πk, v∗〉 = 1
1 + r
〈µ, v∗〉+ r
1 + r
〈pΠ, v∗〉 (18)
where r > 0 is the exit rate of C. As µ is supported on C by definition, and the limit values are
constant on C (see Lemma 3.21 (i)) one has 〈µ, v∗〉 = v∗(k). By Corollary 3.31, 〈Πk, v∗〉 = v∗(k).
Hence:
〈pΠ, v∗〉 =
∑
k∈K
p(k)〈Πk, v∗〉 = 〈p, v∗〉,
so that (18) can be rewritten as
v∗(k) =
1
1 + r
v∗(k) +
r
1 + r
〈p, v∗〉
The choice of the cycle (i.e. C is recurrent) implies that r > 0, so that v∗(k) = 〈p, v∗〉. Proposition
3.23 (i) yields then the equality 〈µ, g∗〉 = v∗(k), which concludes the proof.
Note that the previous result can be read as follows: for any recurrent cycle C and any k ∈ C,
the average payoff obtained before leaving the cycle, and the expected value starting from the exit
state, both coincide and are equal to v∗(k).
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3.4 Part 4: A limit martingale
We already argued (see Lemma 3.21 (i)) that the limit values are constant inside relevant cycles.
For each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L let v˜∗ℓ be the limit value starting from (any state of) Cℓ, and let v˜∗ ∈ RL be the
corresponding vector. Similarly, let π˜t(k, ℓ) :=
∑
k′∈Cℓ
πt(k, k
′) be the probability of being in the
cycle Cℓ at time t, starting from k ∈ K, and let π˜t ∈ RK×L be the corresponding matrix. The next
lemma will be very useful in order to establish the invariance property πtv
∗ = v∗ for all t ∈ [0, 1],
which generalizes Corollary 3.31.
Lemma 3.33. The following relations hold:
(i) Φv˜∗ = v∗
(ii) πtv
∗ = π˜tv˜
∗ for all t ∈ [0, 1]
(iii) Mv∗ = v˜∗
(iv) Av˜∗ = 0
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Φ ∈ RK×L, A ∈ RL×L, M ∈ RL×K and πt ∈ RK×K . Hence, the
first two relations are equalities in RK , while the two last ones are equalities in RL. The first relation
is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.21 (i) and (iii), which imply that
∑L
ℓ=1Φ(k, ℓ)v˜
∗
ℓ = v
∗(k) for
all k ∈ K. Similarly, (ii) holds because for each k ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
〈πt(k, · ), v∗〉 =
L∑
ℓ=1
∑
k′∈Cℓ
πt(k, k
′)v∗(k′)
=
L∑
ℓ=1
v˜∗ℓ
∑
k′∈Cℓ
πt(k, k
′)
= 〈π˜t(k, · ), v˜∗〉
The relation (iii) is straightforward too: by definition, the ℓ-th coordinate of Mv∗ is equal to
〈µℓ, v∗〉, where µℓ is the mixing distribution of Cℓ. But this equals v˜∗ℓ because µℓ is supported on
Cℓ and because the value is constant on cycles. To prove (iv), let us fix ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and recall
that by definition A(ℓ, ℓ′) = rℓ
∑
k∈K pℓ(k)Φ(k, ℓ
′) for all ℓ′ 6= ℓ and A(ℓ, ℓ) = −∑ℓ′ 6=ℓA(ℓ, ℓ′),
where rℓ > 0 and pℓ ∈ ∆(K) are, respectively, the exit rate and exit distribution of Cℓ. Hence:∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
A(ℓ, ℓ′)v˜∗ℓ′ = rℓ
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k)
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
Φ(k, ℓ′)v˜∗ℓ′
= rℓ
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k) (v˜
∗(k)− Φ(k, ℓ)v˜∗ℓ )
= v˜∗ℓ rℓ
(
1−
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k)Φ(k, ℓ)
)
= v˜∗ℓ
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
A(ℓ, ℓ′)
= −v˜∗ℓA(ℓ, ℓ)
where the first and last equalities come from the definition of A, the second follows from (i), the
third from the relation
∑
k∈K pℓ(k)v
∗(k) = v˜∗ℓ obtained in Corollary 3.32, and the fourth one from∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
A(ℓ, ℓ′) = rℓ
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k)
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓ
Φ(k, ℓ′) = rℓ
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k)(1 − Φ(k, ℓ)) = rℓ(1 −
∑
k∈K
pℓ(k)Φ(k, ℓ))
Thus,
∑
ℓ′ 6=ℓA(ℓ, ℓ
′)v˜∗ℓ′ +A(ℓ, ℓ)v˜
∗
ℓ = 0, which proves (iv).
One can deduce the following invariance property for the limit values.
Corollary 3.34. πtv
∗ = v∗ for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. It is enough to prove that π0v
∗ = v∗ and ( ∂∂tπt)v
∗ = 0. The first relation holds because by
definition π0v
∗ = ΦMv∗, which is equal to v∗ by Lemma 3.33 (i) and (iii). For the second, set
να := π˜1−e−α = Φe
αA for all α ≥ 0. By Lemma 3.33 (ii), it is enough to prove that ( ∂∂t π˜t)v˜∗ = 0.
But this follows from Lemma 3.33 (iv), since for all α ≥ 0 one has:( ∂
∂α
να
)
v˜∗ = (ΦeαAA)v˜∗ = 0
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Remark 3.35. Corollary 3.34 has a remarkable interpretation. Fix an initial state k ∈ K and
let (Xkt )t∈[0,1] be a continuous-time process with values in K and law (πt(k, · ))t∈[0,1]. Then, the
following process is a real-valued martingale over [0, 1] with expectation v∗(k):
Mkt := v
∗(Xkt )
Remark 3.36. We already proved that the limit value is constant inside relevant cycles. Not
surprisingly, it is also constant inside any cycle (in the usual sense of the word) of mixing height
strictly smaller than 1 − 12N , since these states act as a single, aggregated state from the very
beginning of the game. More surprisingly, the value is also constant inside the recurrence classes
of the continuous-time chain of generator A. Thus, if the cycle structure induced by an optimal
Puiseux strategy profile was the one in the example of Section 3.1.2, the limit value function would
then be independent from the initial state.
3.4.1 A continuous-time Shapley equation
We can now end the proof of Theorem 3.1. To do so, let us prove a continuous-time version of
Shapley equation.
Proposition 3.37 (Limit Shapley equation). For any t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
v∗ =
∫ t
0
πsg
∗ds+ (1− t)πtv∗
Proof. By Shapley [14] for any λ ∈ (0, 1] and any initial state k1 one has:
vλ(k1) = E
k1
λ [g1 + vλ(k2)]
Iterating the previous relation, for any t ∈ [0, 1) and k ∈ K one has:
vλ(k) = E
k
λ
[∑ϕ(λ,t)
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1gm
]
+ (1 − λ)ϕ(λ,t)Ekλ
[
vλ(kϕ(λ,t))
]
As λ converges to 0, the first term in the right-hand-side converges to
∫ t
0 〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds by Lemma
3.20. For the second term, one has limλ→0(1 − λ)ϕ(λ,t) = 1 − t and by Proposition 3.14 and the
definition of πt:
lim
λ→0
E
k
λ
[
vλ(kϕ(λ,t))
]
= 〈πt(k, · ), v∗〉
The weak constant payoff property (i.e. Theorem 3.1) follows now from Lemma 3.20, Proposition
3.37 and Corollary 3.34. Indeed, for each initial state k belonging to a recurrent cycle one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) =
∫ t
0
〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds (by Lemma 3.20)
= v∗(k)− (1 − t)〈πt(k, · ), v∗〉 (by Proposition 3.37)
= tv∗(k) (by Corollary 3.34)
By Lemma 3.21 (ii) the constant payoff property holds for any initial state belonging to an absorbing
cycle. Finally, Lemma 3.21 (iii) implies that the property also holds for any initial state which is
transient. Indeed, for any such k ∈ TR one has, for any selection (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ C1 × · · · × CL:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t) =
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ(k, ℓ) lim
λ→0
γλ(kℓ, x
1
λ, x
2
λ; t)
=
L∑
ℓ=1
Φ(k, ℓ)tv∗(kℓ)
= tv∗(k)
Hence, the weak constant property holds for any initial state. To obtain the uniform convergence,
note that for every λ ∈ (0, λ0), the functions t 7→ γλ(k, x1λ, x2λ; t) are equi-Lipschitz (with constant
‖g‖); the pointwise convergence implies the uniform convergence. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is
complete. 
Remark 3.38. Derivating the relation
∫ t
0 〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds = tv∗(k), one obtains 〈πt(k, · ), g∗〉 =
v∗(k) which is a reformulation of the constant payoff property.
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4 The strong constant payoff property
The aim of this section is to prove our main result: Theorem 2.5. Roughly speaking, we want to
prove that the constant payoff property, which is true for any optimal Puiseux strategy profile,
holds for any couple of optimal strategies. The main idea is the following: an equivalence between
the strong payoff property and the convergence to 0 of the discounted values of a certain class of
Markov decision processes. We start with a technical property for real sequences, from which we
derive an equivalent formulation of the strong payoff property.
For each k ∈ K, define X1λ(k) ⊂ ∆(I) (resp., X2λ(k) ⊂ ∆(J)) the set of optimal strategies for
Player 1 (resp., 2) in the one-shot zero-sum game with action sets I and J and payoff:
R(i, j) := λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)vλ(k′) (19)
The following lemma is a direct consequence of [13, Corollary 2.6.3, p.56]. We state it for Player
1 but, as players have symmetric roles, a similar result holds for Player 2.
Lemma 4.1. A general strategy σ1 of Player 1 is optimal in the discounted stochastic game Γλ(k)
if, and only if for any m ≥ 1, for any strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2 of Player 2 and any finite history hm ∈ Hm
such that Pk1σ1,σ2(h
m) > 0, Player 1 plays a mixed action in X1λ(km).
4.1 Part 5: A technical lemma
4.1.1 On real sequences
Let (uλm)m≥1 be a family of real sequences such that, for some constant C ≥ 0, for all λ ∈ (0, 1]
and all m ≥ 1 one has: ∣∣uλm+1 − uλm∣∣ ≤ Cλ and ∣∣uλm∣∣ ≤ C (20)
The sequence being fixed throughout Section 4.1.1, for each δ > 0 we set:
Bλ(δ) :=
∑
m≥1
δλ(1 − δλ)m−1uλm
Proposition 4.2. The two following statements are equivalent:
(i) For all t ∈ [0, 1), uλϕ(λ,t) vanishes as λ tends to 0.
(ii) For all δ > 0, Bλ(δ) vanishes as λ tends to 0.
Proof. Assume (i). Let δ > 0 and a > 0. Condition (20) implies that the family of functions t →
uλϕ(λ,t) defined on [0, 1) and indexed with λ ∈ (0, 1], is equi-Lipschitz on the interval [0, 1−e−a] and
uniformly bounded by C. Consequently, by (i), the family converges uniformly to 0 on [0, 1− e−a]
as λ goes to 0. Moreover, one has:
|Bλ(δ)| ≤
⌊ aλ ⌋∑
m=1
δλ(1− δλ)m−1uλm + (1 − δλ)⌊
a
λ ⌋C
≤ sup
1≤m≤⌊ aλ ⌋
|uλm|+ (1 − δλ)⌊
a
λ ⌋C
Note that for all 1 ≤ m ≤ ⌊ aλ⌋ one has |uλm| ≤ supt∈[0,1−e−a] uλϕ(λ,t), and the right-hand side tends
to 0 as λ vanishes by (i). It follows that lim supλ→0 |Bλ(δ)| ≤ e−δaC. Taking a→ +∞ proves (ii).
Conversely, assume (ii). Fix λ ∈ (0, 1] and δ > 0. Let
t1 := 0 and tN :=
N−1∑
m=1
δλ(1− δλ)m−1 = 1− (1− δλ)N−1, ∀N ≥ 2
Note that (tm)m≥1 depends on λ and δ, but we have preferred to omit this dependence to simplify
the notation. Let f δλ : [0, 1) → R be the linear interpolation of (uλm)m≥1 through the sequence of
times (tm)m≥1, i.e.
f δλ(t) :=
(t− tm)(uλm+1 − uλm)
tm+1 − tm + u
λ
m, ∀m ≥ 1, ∀t ∈ [tm, tm+1)
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By construction,
∫ tm+1
tm
∣∣uλm − f δλ(t)∣∣ dt ≤ (tm+1 − tm)Cλ for any m ≥ 1, so that∣∣∣∣∑m≥1 δλ(1− δλ)m−1uλm −
∫ 1
0
f δλ(t)dt
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∑m≥1
∫ tm+1
tm
uλmdt−
∫ 1
0
f δλ(t)dt
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
m≥1
∫ tm+1
tm
∣∣uλm − f δλ(t)∣∣ dt
≤ Cλ
Consequently, (ii) implies that
lim
λ→0
∫ 1
0
f δλ(t)dt = 0 (21)
Let s ∈ [0, 1). Let U be an accumulation point of (uλϕ(λ,s))λ∈(0,1]. Because this family is uni-
formly bounded it is enough to prove that U = 0. Let (λn)n≥1 be a vanishing sequence such
that limn→+∞ u
λn
ϕ(λn,s)
= U . The sequence (f1λn)n≥1 is equi-Lipschitz and bounded on the interval
[0, 1 − ǫ], for any ǫ > 0. Therefore, up to extracting a sub-sequence, there exists a continuous
function F : [0, 1)→ R such that f1λn converges uniformly to F on all intervals [0, 1− ǫ], ǫ > 0. Let
t ∈ [0, 1). Recall from Section 2.1.3 (see (3)-(4)) that one has limλ→0 η(δλ, ϕ(δλ, t)) = t, and thus:
lim
λ→0
|f δλ(t)− uλϕ(δλ,t)| = 0 (22)
Also, as ϕ(δλ, t) = ϕ(λ, 1 − (1− t)1/δ) + o(1/λ) it follows that:
lim
λ→0
|f δλ(t)− uλϕ(λ,1−(1−t)1/δ)| = 0 (23)
and
lim
λ→0
|f δλ(t)− f1λ(1 − (1− t)1/δ)| = 0 (24)
From the equalities (21) and (24), the fact that (f δλ)λ is uniformly bounded by C and the definition
of F , one obtains: ∫ 1
0
F (1− (1− t)1/δ)dt = 0 (25)
By the change of variables s := 1− (1− t)1/δ, we get∫ 1
0
(1− s)δ−1F (s)ds = 0 (26)
As (26) holds for any δ > 0, it follows that for any polynomial function P , one has:∫ 1
0
P (s)F (s)ds = 0 (27)
Because F is continuous, this property implies that F = 0. Hence, we have proved that f1λn
converges uniformly to 0 on all intervals [0, 1 − ǫ], where ǫ > 0 is arbitrary. From (22) and (24),
one gets limλ→0 |f1λ(t)− uλϕ(λ,t)| = 0. Thus, U = 0 and (i) is proved.
4.1.2 Application to stochastic games
The goal of this section is to provide several alternative characterizations of the strong payoff
property which will be used to establish Theorem 2.5.
Proposition 4.3. Let (σ1λ, σ
2
λ)λ be a family of optimal strategy profiles. The following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) The family (σ1λ, σ
2
λ)λ satisfies the constant payoff property.
(ii) For all k ∈ K, for all t ∈ [0, 1), Ek
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[vλ(kϕ(λ,t))]− vλ(k) converges to 0 as λ vanishes.
(iii) For all k ∈ K, for all δ > 0 one has:
lim
λ→0
E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[∑
m≥1
δλ(1 − δλ)m−1(vλ(km)− vλ(k))
]
= 0. (28)
25
4.2 Part 6: The auxiliary MDP 4 THE STRONG CONSTANT PAYOFF PROPERTY
Proof. Let us start by proving the equivalence between (i) and (ii). Shapley equation yields:
vλ(k) = E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[∑ϕ(λ,t)−1
m=1
λ(1 − λ)m−1gm
]
+ (1 − λ)ϕ(λ,t)−1Ekσ1λ,σ2λ
[
vλ(kϕ(λ,t))
]
where km stands for the state at stage m, for any m ∈ N∗. Consequently:
E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[∑ϕ(λ,t)−1
m=1
λ(1− λ)m−1gm
]
− tvλ(k) + (1− λ)ϕ(λ,t)−1
(
E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[
vλ(kϕ(λ,t))
]− vλ(k))
=
(
1− t− (1− λ)ϕ(λ,t)−1
)
vλ(k)
The equivalence follows then from the relation limλ→0(1− λ)ϕ(λ,t)−1 = 1− t.
Let us now prove that (i) and (iii) are equivalent. Let (σ1λ, σ
2
λ)λ be a fixed family of optimal
strategies. For each λ ∈ (0, 1] and m ≥ 1, define
uλm := E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[vλ(km)]− vλ(k)
Note that the family of sequences (uλm) satisfies (20) with C = ‖g‖. Therefore, Proposition 4.2
applies, and gives the desired result.
The following result is now a direct consequence of Proposition 4.3.
Corollary 4.4. The stochastic game Γ satisfies the strong constant payoff property (SP) if and
only if for all family of optimal strategies (σ1λ, σ
2
λ) and for all δ > 0 one has:
∀k ∈ K lim
λ→0
E
k
σ1λ,σ
2
λ
[∑
m≥1
δλ(1 − δλ)m−1(vλ(km)− vλ(k))
]
= 0 (29)
4.2 Part 6: The auxiliary MDP
Let δ > 0 and k¯ ∈ K be fixed. For each λ ∈ (0, 1], consider a Markov Decision Process (one-player
stochastic game)MDPk¯,δ,λ with state space K, action set Aλ(k) := X
1
λ(k)×X2λ(k) for each k ∈ K,
transition function q, payoff function g : k 7→ vλ(k)− vλ(k¯) and discount factor δλ.
Remark 4.5. At each state, the decision-maker can only play couples of optimal mixed strategies
of the game given in (19). Hence, the sets of possible actions depend on the state and on the
discount factor. Similarly, the payoff function does not depend on the actions but depends on the
discount factor.
For any couple of optimal strategies (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ1λ×Σ2λ of the original λ-discounted stochastic and
any initial state k ∈ K, define:
hλ(k, σ
1, σ2) := Ekσ1λ,σ2λ
[∑
m≥1
δλ(1 − δλ)m−1(vλ(km)− vλ(k¯))
]
(30)
Let wδλ(k) denote the value of this MDP with initial state k, i.e.:
wδλ(k) = sup
(σ1,σ2)∈Σ1λ×Σ
2
λ
hλ(k, σ
1, σ2)
Proposition 4.6. The strong payoff property holds if and only if for all k¯ ∈ K and for all δ > 0
one has limλ→0 w
δ
λ(k¯) = 0.
Proof. This stems from Corollary 4.4.
End of the proof of Theorem 2.5. Let δ > 0 and k¯ ∈ K be fixed. By Proposition 4.6,
it is enough to prove that limλ→0 w
δ
λ(k¯) = 0. Note that, by Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 4.3
(iii), we have lim infλ→0 w
δ
λ(k¯) ≥ 0. Thus, it is enough to prove that lim supλ→0 wδλ(k¯) = 0. By
contradiction, assume that lim supλ→0 w
δ
λ(k¯) > ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
We resort to the semi-algebraic approach. Note that, unlike the classical setup described in Section
2.1.2, where a two-player zero-sum stochastic game Γ was fixed and the discount factor λ was put
to 0, here we have a Markov Decision Process MDPk¯,δ,λ (thus, one player only) which depends on
λ through its action set and payoff function. Nonetheless, the semi-algebraic approach still applies.
Define a subset Sǫ ⊂ R× RK × RK×I × RK×J × RK by setting
(λ, v, x1, x2, h) ∈ Sε if, and only if, the following relations hold:
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• λ ∈ R is some discount factor, that is 0 < λ ≤ 1
• v ∈ RK is the vector of values of the λ-discounted stochastic game Γλ
• (x1, x2) ∈ RK×I × RK×J is a couple of optimal stationary strategies in Γλ
• h ∈ RK satisfies h(k) = hλ(k, x1, x2) for all k ∈ K and h(k¯) ≥ ǫ
The set Sǫ is semi-algebraic, as it can be described by the following finite set of polynomial equalities
and inequalities (compare with the system in Section 2.1.2):
0 < λ ≤ 1
∀(k, i), x1(k, i) ≥ 0, and ∀k,
∑
i∈I
x1(k, i) = 1
∀(k, j), x2(k, j) ≥ 0, and ∀k,
∑
j∈J
x2(k, j) = 1
∀(k, j),
∑
i∈I
x1(k, i)
(
λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)v(k′)
)
≥ v(k)
∀(k, i),
∑
j∈J
x2(k, j)
(
λg(k, i, j) + (1− λ)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)v(k′)
)
≤ v(k)
∀k, δλ(vλ(k)− vλ(k¯)) + (1 − δλ)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
x1(k, i)x2(k, j)
∑
k′∈K
q(k′|k, i, j)h(k′) = h(k)
h(k¯) ≥ ǫ
For λ ∈ (0, 1], denote Sǫ(λ) = {a | (λ, a) ∈ Sǫ}. By assumption, lim supλ→0 wδλ(k¯) > ǫ, thus
there exists a vanishing subsequence (λn) such that for all n, the set Sǫ(λn) is non-empty. By
semi-algebraicity, there exists λ0 ∈ (0, 1] such that Sǫ(λ) is non-empty for all λ ∈ (0, λ0). From
the Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem, it admits a semi-algebraic selection for λ ∈ (0, λ0). In
particular, there exists a selection of stationary strategies zλ := (x
1
λ, x
2
λ) that is admissible in the
Markov decision process MDPk¯,δ,λ, that can be expressed as a Puiseux series near 0 and such that
hλ(k¯, x
1
λ, x
2
λ) ≥ ǫ for all λ small enough. But this contradicts Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 4.3 (iii)
since, together, they imply that limλ→0 hλ(k¯, x
1
λ, x
2
λ) = 0. 
5 Remarks and extensions
The aim of this section is to provide some final remarks, mainly through examples, and extend our
main result in two directions.
5.1 An example
Let us illustrate the constant payoff property by an example, studied by Kohlberg [2]. The state
space is the set K = {1∗, k, ℓ,−1∗}, where a∗ denotes an absorbing state with payoff a, that is
q( · | a∗, i, j) = δa∗ and g(a∗, i, j) = a for all (i, j) ∈ I × J . The transition from states k and ℓ are
deterministic and represented by the two following matrices:
k
k ℓ
ℓ
ℓ 1∗
L R
T
B
k
k
ℓ
−1∗
L R
T
B
The set of actions are I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}. Finally, the payoff function is given by
∀(i, j) ∈ I × J, g(k, i, j) = 1 and g(ℓ, i, j) = −1
Optimal stationary strategies satisfy x1(T ) = x2(L) →λ→0 1 and x1λ(B) = x2λ(R) ∼λ→0
√
λ, so
that the induced Markov chain satisfies:
Qλ ∼λ→0

1 2
√
λ λ 0
2
√
λ 1 0 λ
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

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For simplicity of the presentation, we will write the vectors v, v˜ and g as row vectors, instead of
column vectors - which they are. The limit value is v∗ = (1, 0, 0,−1). The cycles decomposition
and their characteristics are summarized in the following table:
cycles exit height exit rate exit distribution mixing height mixing distribution
{1∗} +∞ − − − −
{k} 1/2 2 (0, 0, 1, 0) − −
{ℓ} 1/2 2 (0, 1, 0, 0) − −
{−1∗} +∞ − − − −
{k, ℓ} 1 1 (12 , 0, 0, 12 ) 12 (0, 12 , 12 , 0)
As the order of transitions are multiple of 1/2, we have N = 2 and, consequently, 1 − 12N = 3/4.
The relevant cycles are C1 = {1∗}, C2 = {k, ℓ} and C3 = {−1∗}, as illustrated below:
0
1/2
3/4
1∗ k ℓ −1∗
C2
Cycle C2 is recurrent since its mixing height and exit height are, respectively, M(C2) = 1/2
and E(C2) = 1, whereas C1 = {1∗} and C3 = {−1∗} are absorbing cycles. To express the matrix
πt ∈ R4×4 of instantaneous positions at time t, it is enough to determine the entrance law Φ ∈ R4×3,
the matrix of mixing distributions M ∈ R3×4 and the infinitesimal generator A ∈ R3×3. As there
are no transient states, Φ is trivial, whereas M is easily obtained by symmetry:
Φ =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 and M =
1 0 0 00 12 12 0
0 0 0 1

Finally, setting r1 = 1 and p1 = (
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 ) in the definition of A(1, ℓ) = r1
∑
k∈K p1(k)Φ(k, ℓ) for
ℓ = 2, 3 yields:
A =
0 0 01
2 −1 12
0 0 0

A direct calculation yields, for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
πt =

1 0 0 0
t
2
1−t
2
1−t
2
t
2
t
2
1−t
2
1−t
2
t
2
0 0 0 1

Integrating, one obtains
Π =
∫ 1
0
πtdt = Φ(Id−A)−1M =

1 0 0 0
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 1

Here g∗ = (1, 1,−1,−1) and v˜∗ = (1, 0,−1).
5.2 The constant payoff is a joint property
Contrary to non-zero sum games, where the notion of Nash equilibrium is a joint property of the
players’ strategies, the notion of optimality is unilateral in zero-sum games. Indeed, by playing an
optimal strategy, Player 1 ensures that his payoff is greater or equal than the value regardless of
the strategy used by his opponent (and similarly for Player 2). Naturally, one would like to know
whether the constant payoff property is an unilateral property as well. That is, can Player 1 ensure
that the average payoff at time t is greater or equal than the value at all times t ∈ (0, 1]?
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The following example gives a negative answer to this question: playing an optimal strategy does
not ensure that the average payoffs are greater or equal than the value at all times. Rather, the
constant payoff property requires both players to play optimally. The example is “as bad as it can
be”, since the unique optimal strategy of Player 1 guarantees strictly less than the value at any time
t ∈ (0, 1), where the fact that this property holds for t = 1 follows from the optimality of his strategy.
Consider the “Big Match”, introduced by Gillette [8], a stochastic game with set of states
K = {k, 0∗, 1∗}, action sets I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}, and where states 0∗ and 1∗ are absorbing
with payoff 0 and 1 respectively, i.e. for all (i, j) ∈ I × J :
q( · |0∗, i, j) = δ0∗ , q( · |1∗, i, j) = δ1∗ , g(0∗, i, j) = 0 and g(1∗, i, j) = 1
The game with initial state k, the non-absorbing state, can be represented as follows:
0
1∗
1
0∗
L R
B
T
As far as Player 1 plays action B, he receives stage payoffs 0 or 1, depending on whether Player 2
plays L or R, and the state does not change, i.e.
g(k,B, L) = 0, g(k,B,R) = 1 and q(k | k,B, L) = q(k | k,B,R) = 1
When Player 1 plays T , the state moves to an absorbing state, indicated by a ∗ in the picture
above, depending on the action of his opponent. For all λ ∈ (0, 1], the value and the unique
optimal stationary strategy profile are given by:
vλ(k) =
1
2
, x1λ(k, T ) =
λ
1 + λ
and x2λ(k, L) =
1
2
Let x2 be the strategy that plays L at every stage. Though not optimal, x2 is a best reply to
x1λ since γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2) = vλ(k) for all λ. Let us show that (x
1
λ, x
2) does not satisfy the constant
payoff property. Indeed, let τ = inf{m ≥ 1, km /∈ k} be the stage at which k is left. We have
P
k
x1λ,x
2(τ ≥ m) = (1/(1 + λ))m so that for all t ∈ [0, 1]:
lim
λ→0
P
k
x1λ,x
2(τ ≥ ϕ(λ, t)) = 1− t
It follows that {k} is a recurrent cycle with exit rate equal to 1. As only state 1∗ can be reached,
the position at time t ∈ [0, 1] induced by (x1λ, x2) is given by πt(k, · ) = (1 − t, 0, t). Similarly, the
limit payoff vector is g∗ = (0, 0, 1). By Lemma 3.20, for all t ∈ [0, 1] one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x
1
λ, x
2; t) =
∫ t
0
〈πs(k, · ), g∗〉ds = t
2
2
The relation t
2
2 < tv
∗(k) for all t ∈ (0, 1) shows that the payoff does not grow linearly during the
game. In fact, Player 2 obtains strictly less than the value (and this is favorable to him) at all
times except for t = 1.
5.3 Stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
Our results extend directly to stochastic games with imperfect monitoring (a.k.a. stochastic games
with signals). Compared to the model studied in the paper, suppose that the players observe the
state, but not the actions; rather, they receive private signals about them. Formally, a stochastic
game with imperfect monitoring is defined by a tuple (K, I, J,A1, A2, g, q) where K, I, J and
g : K × I × J → R, are, as before, the set of states, actions for Player 1 and 2, and payoff function,
the sets A1 and A2 are the set of signals for player 1 and 2 respectively, and
q : K × I × J → ∆(K ×A1 ×A2)
is a transition function. The game goes as follows: every time a pair (i, j) of actions is played at
state k, a triplet (k′, a1, a2) is chosen according to q(k, i, j). The new state k′ is announced to both
players, and Player 1 and 2 are privately informed of a1 and a2, respectively.
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Definition 5.1. A strategy σ1 of Player 1 is a sequence of mappings σ1 = (σ1m) where σ
1
m :
(K ×A1)m−1 ×K → ∆(I), m ≥ 1. Strategies are defined in the same way for Player 2.
The constant payoff property can be defined in exactly the same way as in Section 2. Note
that the proof of the weak payoff constant property only relies on the semi-algebraic approach of
Section 2.1.2. By Shapley [14], the equations of Section 2.1.2 are also satisfied in a stochastic game
with imperfect monitoring. Consequently, the weak constant payoff property extends to this class.
As for the strong payoff property, Lemma 3.29 extends to this model with the same proof. Thus,
Theorem 2.5 holds in this more general setup.
Theorem 5.2. Any stochastic game with imperfect monitoring satisfies the strong payoff property.
5.4 Asymptotically optimal strategies
In this section we provide an extension of Theorem 3.1. As a matter of fact, our proof only involved
the leading terms in the expansions of the optimal Puiseux strategy profile (x1λ, x
2
λ). Consequently,
our result can be extended beyond optimal Puiseux strategies, to a larger family of strategies which
belong to the class of asymptotically optimal strategies : the family (σ1λ)λ of strategies of Player 1 is
asymptotically optimal in the games (Γλ(k))λ if for any family of strategies (σ
2
λ)λ of Player 2 one
has:
lim inf
λ→0
γλ(k, σ
1
λ, σ
2
λ) ≥ v∗(k)
Theorem 5.3 (Weak constant payoff property (bis)). Let (x1λ, x
2
λ)λ be some fixed optimal Puiseux
strategy profile. Then for any family of stationary strategy profiles (x˜1λ, x˜
2
λ)λ satisfying:
lim
λ→0
∣∣∣∣ x˜1λ(k, i)x1λ(k, i) − 1
∣∣∣∣ = 0 and limλ→0
∣∣∣∣ x˜2λ(k, j)x2λ(k, j) − 1
∣∣∣∣ = 0
(with the convention that 0/0 = 1) for all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J , one has:
lim
λ→0
γλ(k, x˜
1
λ, x˜
2
λ; t) = tv
∗(k), ∀t ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. Indeed, if Q˜λ denotes the Markov chain induced by (x˜
1
λ, x˜
2
λ) one has
Q˜λ(k, k
′) ∼λ→0 Qλ(k, k′), ∀(k, k′) ∈ K2
Similarly, for each k, one has limλ→0 γλ(k, x˜
1
λ, x˜
2
λ) = v
∗(k) and limλ→0 g(k, x˜
1
λ(k), x˜
2
λ(k)) = g
∗(k).
All the results go through, with the same proofs. Only Proposition 3.29 needs to be modified, since
x˜1λ and x˜
2
λ are no longer optimal strategies. However, the three results hold up to a vanishing error
term, so that the rest of the proof goes through as well.
The previous result applies, in particular, to a simple stationary strategy profile obtained by
truncating the Puiseux series after the first term. That is, let (c(k, i), e(k, i)) and (c(k, j), e(k, j))
be the leading coefficients and exponents of the Puiseux series x1λ(k, i) and x
2
λ(k, j), respectively,
for all (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J . Define the profile λ 7→ (x˜1λ, x˜2λ)λ by setting for all (k, i, j) and λ:
x˜1λ(k, i) :=
c(k, i)λe(k,i)∑
i′∈I c(k, i
′)λe(k,i′)
and x˜2λ(k, i) :=
c(k, j)λe(k,j)∑
j′∈J c(k, j
′)λe(k,j′)
These “truncated strategies”, which are described by pairs coefficient-exponent for each pair action-
state, are asymptotically optimal (but not necessarily optimal) and satisfy the constant payoff
property.
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